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Preface 
The 86 project within the Special Collaborative Program on "Status Passages and 
Risks in the Life Course" uses advanced quantitative longitudinal methodolgies. A 
great deal of work in this project is directed toward the development of new techniques 
and methods. 
This paper demonstrates that the opportunity for assessing causal inferences varies 
strongly with the type of observation available to the social scientist. The data structure 
(wh ich can be cross-sectional, panel or event oriented) determines the extent to which 
the researcher is forced to make untested assumptions in the process of establishing 
relevant empirical evidence that can serve as a link in a chain of reasoning about 
causal mechanisms. 
The authors of this paper stress that the collection of event history data offer a 
comparatively superior approach for uncovering causa I relationships or mapping out 
systems of causal relations. This is because event history models relate the change 
in future outcomes to conditions in the past at each point in time. 
Prof. Dr. Ansgar Weymann 
Chai, Special Collaborative Programme No. 186 
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1. Introduction 
The rnvestigation of causal relationships is an important but difficult scientific endeavor. 
The opportunity for assessing causal inferences varies strongly with the type of 
observation available to the social scientist. This is because the data structure 
determines the extent to which the researcher is forced to make untested assumptions 
when he or she is trying to establish relevant empirical evidence that can serve as a 
link in a chain of reasoning about causal mechanisms (Goldthorpe 1994). 
In this paper, we first discuss the role of time in causal inferences in the social 
sciences. This will help us to recast a number of research problems so that 
fundamental design issues can be addressed more directly. Then, based on various 
examples, we will describe in detail how different observation plans (cross-secional, 
panel, and event history oriented) affect causal analysis. Although longitudinal data are 
no panacea, they are obviously more effective in causal analysis and have less 
inferential lim itations. 
We will limit our attention to data generated by continuous-time, discrete-state 
substantive processes. These processes have been characterized by James Coleman 
(1981 :6) in the following general way: (1) there are units - which may be individuals, 
organizations, societies, or whatever - that change from one discrete state to another; 
(2) these changes (or events) can occur at any point in time and are not restricted to 
predetermined points in time; and (3) there are time-constant and/or time-dependent 
factors influencing the events. Examples of such process type can be given for a wide 
variety of social research fields (see, e.g., Blossfeld, Hamerle, and Mayer 1989; 
Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). Consider, for example, a person's job career. The job 
history may be described as the time spent in the first job and the date Ule person 
entered into this speil, the type and duration in the following job or the kind of non-
employment and its duration, and so on. 
2. Causal Statements in the Social Sciences 
In this section, we will focus on the general role of time in causal inferences and also 
show that the idea of a causal effect can be represented as a change in the transition 
rate, if the dependent variable is discrete and can change its state at any time. 
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Correlation and Causation 
To begin with, statements about causation should be distinguished from statements 
about association. In making correlational inferences, one can be satisfied to observe 
how the values of one variable are associated with the values of other variables over 
the population under study and perhaps over time. In this context, time is only 
important insofar as it determines the population under analysis or specifies the 
operational meaning of a particular variable (Holland 1986). Statements about 
associations describe what has happened. They are quite different from causal 
statements and are designed to give information about how events are produced or 
conditioned by other events. 
Sometimes social scientists argue that because the units of sociological analysis 
continuously learn and change and involve actors with goals and beliefs, sociology can 
at best only provide systematic descriptions of phenomena at various points in history. 
This position is based on the view that causal statements about events are only 
possible if they are regulated by "eternal,1I time-Iess laws (Kelly and McGrath 1988). 
Of course, the assumption that such laws can be established with regard to social 
processes can reasonably be disputed. However, we are not forced to accept a simple 
contrast: either describing contingent events or assum ing "eternal" laws. Many social 
phenomena show systematic temporal variations and patterned regularities under 
specific conditions that themselves are a legitimate focus of our efforts to understand 
social change (Kelly and McGrath 1988). Thus, sociology can do more than just 
describe the social world. This paper therefore emphasizes the usefulness of 
techniques of event history modeling as IInew" approaches to the investigation of 
causal explanations. 1 
Causal Mechanisms and Substantive Theory 
The identification of causal mechanisms has been one of the classic concerns in 
sociology. Causal statements are made -to explain the occurrence of events, to 
understand why particular events happen, and to make predictions when the situation 
changes (Marini and Singer 1988). Although sociologists sometimes seem to be 
1 We speak of a "new" approach just to emphasize the contrast to traditional"causal 
analysis" based on structural equation models which are basically time-Iess models. 
See the discussion in Bollen (1989), Campbell, Mutran and Parker (1987), or 
Faulbaum and Bentier (1994). 
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opposed to using the word IIcause,1I they are far less reluctant to apply very similar 
words like IIforce,1I lIagency,1I or IIcontrol, 11 when trying to understand social phenomena. 
There is consensus in the fact that causal inferences cannot simply and directly be 
made trom empirical data, regardless of whether they are collected through ingenious 
research designs or summarized by particularly advanced statistical models. Thus, 
using event history observation plans and event history analysis models per se will not 
allow us to prove causality, as is the case for all other statistical techniques. However, 
as we will see in the next section, event-oriented observation designs offer richer 
information and, as we will try to demonstrate in this paper, event history models 
provide more appropriate techniques for exploring causal relations. 
It seems useful to treat causality as being a property of theoretical statements rather 
than the empirical world itself (Goldthorpe 1994). In sociology, causal staternents are 
based primarily on substantive hypotheses which the researcher develops about the 
social world. In this sense, causal inference is theoretically driven (Freedman 1991) 
and it will always reflect the changing state of sociological knowledge in a field. 2 Of 
course, descriptive statements are also dependent on theoretical views guiding the 
selection processes and providing the categories underlying every description. The 
crucial point is however that causal statements need a theoretical argument specifying 
the particular mechanism of how a cause produces an effect or, more generally, in 
which way interdependent forces affect each other in a given setting over time. 
Therefore, the important task of event history modeling is not to demonstrate causal 
processes directly, but to establish relevant empirical evidence that can serve as a link 
in a chain of reasoning about causal mechanisms (Goldthorpe 1994). In this respect, 
event history models might be particularly helpful instruments because they allow a 
time-related empirical representation of the structure of causal arguments. 
Attributes, Causes and Time-Constant Variables 
Holland (1986) tried to establish some links between causal inference and statistical 
modeling. In particular, he emphasized that for a conception of causality it is essential 
that each unit of a population must be exposabl'e to any of the various levels of a 
cause, at least hypothetically. He argues, for example, that the schooling a student 
2 Causal relations are always identified against the background of some field, and 
specification of a field is critical to the identification of an observed relation (Marini 
and Singer 1988). 
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receives can be a cause of the student's performance on a test, whereas the student's 
race or sex cannot. In the former case it seems possible to contemplate measuring 
the causal effect, whereas in the latter cases, where we have the enduring attributes 
of a student, all that can be discussed is association (see also Yamaguchi 1991). 
We agree with Holland that it is essential for causal statements to imply counterfactual 
reasoning: 11 the cause had been different, there would have been another outcome, 
at least with a certain probability. In this sense, counterfactual statements reflect 
imagined situations. It is not always clear, however, which characteristics of a situation 
can sensibly be assumed to be variable, i.e. can be used in counterfactual reasoning, 
and which characteristics should be regarded as fixed. At least to some degree, the 
distinction depends on the field of investigation. For example, from a sociological point 
of view what is important with regard to sex is not the biological attributes per se, but 
the social meaning attached to these attributes. The social meaning of these attributes 
can change regardless of whether their biological basis changes or not. For example, 
societal rules might change to create more equality between the races or sexes. We 
therefore think that in sociological applications counterfactuals can also be meaningful-
Iy applied to such attributes. They can be represented as time-constant "variables" in 
statistical models to investigate their possible impact on some outcome to be 
explained. It is, however, important to be quite explicit about the sociological meaning 
of causal statements which involve references to biological or ethnic attributes. There 
is, for example, no eternal law connecting gender and/or race with wage differentials. 
But probably there are social mechanisms which connect gender and ethnic 
differences with different opportunities in the labor market. 
Causes and Time-Dependent Variables 
The meaning of the counterfactual reasoning of causal statements is that causes are 
states wh ich could be different from what they actually are. However, the consequenc-
es of conditions that could be different from their actual state are obviously not observ-
able.3 It means that it is simply impossible to observe the effect that would have 
happened on the same unit of analysis, if it were exposed to another condition at the 
same time. To find an empirical approach to causal statements, the researcher must 
look at conditions which actually do change in time. These changes are events. More 
formally, an event is a change in a variable, and this change must happen at a specific 
point in time. This implies that the most obvious empirical representation of causes is 
3 Holland (1986) calls this "the fundamental problem of causal inference." 
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in terms of variables that can change their states over time. This statement is linked 
very naturally with the concept of time-dependent covariates in event history analysis. 
The role of a time-dependent covariate in this approach is to indicate that a (qualitative 
or metric) causal factor has changed its state at a specific time and that the unit under 
study is exposed to another causal condition. For example, in the case of gender the 
causal events might be the steps in the acquisition of gender roles over the life course 
or the exposure to sex-specific opportunities in the labor market at a specific historical 
time. Thus, a time-constant variable "gender" should ideally be replaced in an 
empirical analysis by time-changing events assumed to produce sex-specific 
differences in the life history of men and women. Of course, in empirical research that 
is not always possible, so that one very often has to rely on time-constant "variables" 
as weil. However, it is important to recognize that for these variables the implied 
longitudinal causal relation is not exam ined. For example, if we observe an association 
amongst people with different levels of educational attainment and their job 
opportunities, then we can normally draw the conclusion that changes in job 
opportunities are a result of changes in educational attainment level. The implied idea 
is the following: if we started having people with the lowest educational attainment 
level and followed them over the life course, they would presumably differ in their rates 
to attaining higher levels of educational attainment and this would produce changes 
in job opportunities. Whether this would be the case for each individual is not very 
clear from a study that is based on people with different levels of educational 
attainment. In particular, one would expect that the causal relationship between 
education and job opportunities would radically be altered if all people acquired a 
higher (or the highest) level of educational attainment.4 Thus, the two statements - the 
first about associations across different members of a population and the second 
about dependencies in the life course for each individual member of the population -
are quite different; one type of statement can be empirically true while the other one 
can be empirically false. Therefore, statements of the first type cannot be regarded as 
substitutes for statements of the second type. However, since all causal propositions 
have consequences for longitudinal change (see Lieberson 1985), only time-changing 
variables provide the most convincing empirical evidence of causal relations. 5 
4 A longitudinal approach would provide, however, the opportunity to study these 
kinds of changes in the causal relationships over time. 
5 There is also another aspect that is important here (see Lieberson 1985): causal 
relationships can be symmetrie or asymmetrie. In examining the causal influence 
of a change in a variable X on a change in adependent variable V, one has to 
consider whether shifts to a given value of X from either direction have the same 
consequences for V. For example, rarely do researchers consider whether an 
upward shift on the prestige scale, say from 20 to 40, will lead to a different 
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Time Order and Causal Effects 
We can summarize our view of causal statements in the following way: 
~Xt ~ ~ Yt' t < t' 
meaning that a change in variable Xt at time t is a cause of a change in variable Yt' 
at a later point in time, t'. It is not implied, of course, that Xt is the only cause which 
might affect Yt'. So we should speak of causal conditions to stress that there might be, 
and normally is, a quite camplex set of causes. 6 Thus, if causal statements are 
studied empirically, they must intrinsically be related to time. There are three important 
aspects. First, to speak of a change in variables necessarily implies reference to a 
time axis. We need at least two points in time to observe that a variable has changed 
its value. Of course, at least approximately, we can say that a variable has changed 
its value at a specific point in time.? Therefore, we use the symbols to refer to 
changes in the values of the time-dependent variable ~Xt and the state variable ~ Yt 
at time t. This leads to the important point that causal statements relate changes in 
two ( or more) variables. 
outcome of Y (say family decisions) than would a downward shift of X from 60 to 
40. In other words, most researchers assume symmetry. However, even if a change 
is reversible, the causal process may not be. The question is: if a change in a 
variable X causes a change in another one, Y, what happens to Y if X returns to 
its earlier level? "Assuming everything else is constant, a process is reversible, if 
the level of Y also returns to its initial condition; a process is irreversible if Y does 
not return to its earlier level. Observe that it is the process - not the event - that 
is being described as reversible or irreversible." (Lieberson 1985:66) 
6 It is important to note here that the effect of a variable X is always measured 
relative to other causes. A conjunctive plurality of causes occurs if various factors 
must be jointly present to produce an effect. Disjunctive plurality of causes, on the 
other hand, occurs if the effect is produced by each of several factors alone, and 
the joint occurrence of two or more factors does not alter the effect (see the 
extensive discussion in Marini and Singer (1988)). 
? Statements like this implicitly refer to some specification of "point in time. 11 The 
meaning normally depends on the kind of events which are to be described, for 
instance, a marriage, the birth of a child, or to become unemployed. In event history 
text books, normally a continuous time axis for purposes of mathematical modeling 
is assumed (see Blossfeld and Rowher 1995). This should however be understood 
as an idealized way of representing social time. Here we are using mathematical 
concepts to speak about social reality, so we will disregard the dispute about 
whether time is "continuous" (in the mathematical sense of this word), or not. 
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Second, there is a time ordering between causes and effects. The cause must 
precede the effect in time: t < t', in the formal representation given above. This seems 
to be generally accepted.8 As an implication, there must be a temporal interval 
between the change in a variable representing a cause, and a change in the variable 
representing a corresponding effect. It is important to realize that the role of time in 
causal explanations does not only lie in specifying a temporal order in which the effeet 
follows the cause in time. It additionally implies that a temporal interval is necessary 
for the cause to have an impact (Kelly and McGrath 1988). In other words, if the 
cause has to precede the effeet in time, it takes some finite amount of time for the 
cause to produce the effect. The time interval may be very short or very long, but can 
never be zero or infinity (Kelly and McGrath 1988). Some effects take place almost 
instantaneously. For example, if the effect occurs at microseeond intervals, then the 
process must be observed in these small time units to uneover causal relations. 
However, some effects may occur in a time interval too small to be measured by any 
given methods, so that cause and effect seem to oceurat the same point in time. 
Apparent simultaneity is often the case in those social science applications where 
basic observation intervals are relatively crude (e.g. days, months, or even years), 
such as, for example, yearly data about first marriage and first childbirth (Blossfeld, 
Manting and Rohwer 1993). For these parallel processes, the events "first marriage" 
and "first childbirth" may be functionally interdependent, but whether these two events 
are observed simultaneously or successively depends on the degree of temporal 
refinement of the seale used in making the observations. Other effects need a long 
time until they start to occur. Thus, there is a delay or lag between cause and effeet 
that must be specified in an appropriate causal analysis. However, in most of the 
current sociological theories and interpretations of research findings this interval is left 
unspecified. 
This immediately leads to a third point. In addition to the question of how long the 
delay between the timing of the cause and the beginning of the unfolding of the effect 
is, there might be different shapes of how the causal effect Yt unfolds over time. While 
the problem of time-Iags is widely recognized in social science literature, there is 
almost no information with respect to the temporal shapes of effects (Kelly and 
McGrath 1988). Social scientists seem to be quite ignorant with respect to the fact that 
causal effects could be highly time-dependent, too. The panels of Figure 1 illustrate 
several possible shapes these effects may trace over time. In Figure 1 a, there is an 
almost all-at-once change that is then maintained; in Figure 1 b, the effect oecurs with 
some lengthy time-lag and is then time-invariant; in Figure 1 c, the effect starts almost 
8 See, for instance, the discussion in Eells (1991, Ch.,5). 
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a) Effect occurs alm ost immediately and is then 
time-constant. 
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Figure 1 Different temporal shapes of how a change in a variable x, occurring at 
point in time tx, effects a change in a variable y. 
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immediately and then gradually increases; in Figure 1 d, there is an almost all-at-once 
increase, which reaches a maximum after some time and then decreases; finally, in 
Figure 1 e, a cyclical effect pattern over time is described. Thus, an appropriate 
understanding of causal relations between variables should take into account that the 
causal relationship itself may change over time. This seems particularly important in 
sociological applications of causal reasoning. In these applications we generally cannot 
rely on the assumption of eternal, time-Iess laws but have to recognize that the causal 
mechanisms may change during the development of social processes. 
Actors and Probabilistic Causal Relations 
It seems agreed that social phenomena are always directly or indirectly based on 
actions of individuals. This clearly separates the social from the natural sciences. 
Sociology therefore does not deal with associations among variables per se, but with 
variables that are associated via acting people. There are at least three consequences 
for causal relations: First, in methodological terms, this means that if individuals relate 
causes and effects through their actions, then research on social processes should at 
best be based on individual longitudinal data (Coleman and Hao 1989; Coleman 
1990). This is why life history data on individuals, and not aggregated longitudinal 
data, provide the most appropriate information for the analyses of social processes. 
Only with these data can one trace the courses of action at the level of each individual 
over time. Second, in theoretical terms it means that the explaining or understanding 
of social processes requires a time-related specification of (1) 
the past and present conditions under which people act,9 (2) the many and possibly 
conflicting goals that they pursue at the present time, (3) the beliefs and expectations 
guiding the behavior, and (4) the actions that probably will follow in the future. lO 
9 These conditions are, of course, heavily molded by social structural regularities in 
the past and the present. Sociology must always be a historical discipline 
(Goldthorpe 1991). 
10 Sometimes it is argued that, since human actors act intentionally and behavior is 
goal-oriented, the intentions or motives of actors to bring about some effect in the 
future causes the actor to behave in a specific way in the present (Marini and 
Singer 1988). This does not however contradict a causal view. One simply has to 
distinguish intentions, motives or plans as they occur in the present from their 
impact on the behavior which follows their formation temporally, and from the final 
result, as an outcome of the behavior. An expectation about a future state of affairs 
should clearly be distinguished from what eventually happens in the future. 
Therefore, the fact that social agents can behave intentionally, based on expecta-
tions, does not reverse the time order underlying our causal statements. 
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Third, if it is people that are doing the acting, then causal inference must also take into 
account the free will of individuals. This introduces an essential element of indetermi-
nacy into causal inferences. This means that in sociology we can only reasonably 
account for and model the generality but not the determinacy of behavior. The aim of 
substantive and statistical models must therefore be to capture common elements in 
the behavior of people, or patterns of action that recur in many cases (Goldthorpe 
1994). This means that in sociological applications randomness has to enter as a 
defining characteristic of causal models. We can only hope to make sensible causal 
statements about how a given or (hypothesized) change in variable ~ in the past 
affects the probability of a change in variable YI' in the future. Correspondingly, the 
basic causal relation becomes 
t < t' (1.1) 
This means that a change in the time-dependent covariate Xt will change the 
probability that the dependent variable YI' will change in the future (t' > t). In sociology, 
this interpretation seems more appropriate than the traditional deterministic approach. 
The essential difference is not that our knowledge about causes is insufficient because 
it only allows probabilistic statements, but that the causal effect to be explained is a 
probability. Thus, probability in this context is not just a technical term anymore, but 
is considered as a theoretical one: it is the propensity of social agents to change their 
behavior. 
Causal Statements and Limited Empirical Observations 
A quite different type of randomness related to making inferences occurs if causal 
statements are applied to real-world situations in the social sciences. There are at 
least four additional reasons to expect further randomness in empirical studies. These 
are basically the same ones that occur in deterministic approaches and are well-known 
from traditional regression modeling (Lieberson 1991). The first one is measurement 
error, a serious problem in empirical social research, which means that the observed 
data deviate somewhat from the predicted pattern without invalidating the causal 
proposition. The second reason is particularly important in the case of non-experiment-
al data. It is often the case that complex multivariate causal relations operate in the 
social world. Thus, a given outcome can occur because of the presence of more than 
one influencing factor. Moreover, it mayaiso not occur at times because the impact 
of one independent variable is outweighed by other influences working in the opposite 
direction. In these situations, the observed influence of the cause is only approximate, 
unless one can control for the other important factors. The third motive is that 
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sociologists often do not know or are not able to measure all of the important factors. 
Thus, social scientists have to relinquish the idea of a complete measurement of 
causal effects, even if they would like to make a deterministic proposition. Finally, 
sometimes chance affects observed outcomes in the social world. It is not important 
here to decide whether chance per se exists or whether it is only a surrogate for the 
poor state of our knowledge of additional influences and/or inadequate measurement. 
In summary, these problems imply that social scientists can only hope to make 
empirical statements with a probabilistic character. This situation normally leads to 
identification problems. Without strong assumptions about missing information and 
errors in the available data, it is generally not possible to find definite statements about 
causal relations (see Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). 
A Simplistic Conception of Causal Relations 
At this point it is important to stress that the concept of causal relation is a rather 
special abstraction implying a time-related structure that does not immediately follow 
from our sensory impressions. Consider the following example in Figure 2 where we 
characterize the necessary time-related observations of a unit being affected by a 
causal effect. This figure shows that an empirical representation of the most simple 
causal effect, (i.e. (1) where the condition Xt changes (from one state Xt1= x1 to 
another one Xt2 = x2) and (2) is then constant afterwards, (3) the change in Yt (from 
Yt2 = Y1 to Yt3 = Y2) takes place almost instantaneously and (4) is then also 
time-constant afterwards) needs at least three points in time where the researcher 
m ust note the states of the independent and dependent variables, respectively.11 Th is 
is because, if we assume that a change in the independent variable Xt has taken place 
at t2, then, to be able to fix the particular change in the condition in the past, we need 
to know the state of the independent variable Xt at an earlier time, t1 (see Figure 2). 
For the dependent variable Yt we need an observation before the effect has started 
to occur. Assuming everything else is constant, this observation can be made, at the 
latest at point t2 because the effect has to follow the cause in time. To evaluate 
whether the hypothesized effect has indeed taken place at a later time, t_3, we must 
again note the state of the dependent variable Yt. Thus, a simplistic representation of 
a causal effect exists when we compare the change in the observations for the 
independent variable in the past and the present with the change in the observations 
11 This example is instructive because Lazarsfeld (1948,1972), and many others after 
him have argued that for causal inferences two observations of the units would be 
sufficient. 
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Yt 
Y2 
Yl~--------------
~--------------------------.--------. t 
:i 
X1-t-1---
~. ------~--------~----------------. t 
Figure 2 Observation of a simple causal effect. 
for the dependent variable in the present and in the future and link both changes with 
a substantive argument. 12 
However, this is only a simple and fairly unrealistic example of a causal effect. In the 
case of observational data in the social sciences, where there are many (qualitative 
and metric) causal variables that might change their values at any point in time, when 
their causa I effects might have various delays and different shapes in time (see Figure 
1), then the quantity of the observed causal effect as shown in Figure 1 will strongly 
depend on when the measurements at the three points in time are taken. 
Thus, what can we say about the causal effect(s) at any given point in time if the 
situation is more complex? A paradox occurs: the concept of causal effect depends 
intrinsically on comparisons between changes in both the independent and dependent 
variables in at least three points in time. Yet the concept of causal effect should itself 
reflect astate of a unit of observation at any point in time as being an appropriate one 
in real empirical situations. Thus, what is still needed in our discussion is a concept 
that represents the quantity of the causal effect at any point in time. 
Causal Effects and Changes in Transition Rates 
If the dependent variable is discrete and can change its state at any time, then the 
transition rate framework offers a time-point-related representation for the causal 
effect. We briefly want to develop this idea. 
12 Indeed such a simplistic idea of the causal effect is the basis of all panel designs, 
as shown in the next section. 
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Let us first start with the dependent variable, Yl' and its changes in the future (as a 
consequence of a change in a causal factor). In particular, we are interested in 
changes of states occupied by the units of analysis. The state space is assumed to 
be discrete, and so the possible changes are discrete. We assume that a unit enters 
at time to into the (origin) state j, that is Yto = j. The basic form of change to be 
explained in the transition rate framework is the probability of a change in Yt from an 
origin state j to adestination state k (while t > to)' Now, we need a concept that allows 
describing the development of the process at every point in time, while the process 
is going on, and that, for its definition, only relies on information about the past 
development of the process. The crucial concept that can be used for this purpose is 
the transition rate. To define this concept, let us first introduce a random variable T to 
represent the duration, beginning at to, until a change in the dependent vanable, that 
is a transition from (origin) state j to (destination) state k, occurs. To simplify the 
notation we will assume that to = O. Then, the following probability can be defined: 
Pr(t ::; t < t' I T ~ t) t < t' (1.2) 
This is the probability that an event occurs in the time interval from t to t', given that 
no event (transition) has occurred before, that is, in the interval from 0 to t. This 
probability is weil defined and obviously weil suited to describe the temporal evolution 
of the process. The definition refers to each point in time while the process is evolving, 
and thereby can express the idea of change during its development. Also, the 
definition only relies on information about the past of the process, what has happened 
up to the present point in time, t. Therefore, the concept defined in (1) can sensibly 
be used to describe the process before it has finished for all individuals in the 
population. Assume that we know the probabilities defined in (1.2) for all points in time 
up to a certain point f. Then we have a description of the process up to this point, and 
this description is possible without knowing how the process will develop in the future, 
i.e. for t > f. 
Since our mathematical model is based on a continuous time axis, one can in the 
expression (1.2) let 1'- t approach zero. However, as the length of the time interval 
approaches zero, the concept of change in the dependent variable would simply 
disappear because the probability that a change takes place in an interval of zero 
length is zero: 
lim Pr(t ~ t < t' I T ~ t) = 0 
1'-) t 
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To avoid this, we regard the ratio of the transition probability to the length of the time 
interval to represent the probability of futu re changes in the dependent variable Q§f 
unit of time (Coleman 1968), i.e. we consider 
Pr(t :::; t < t' I T ~ t) / (1'- t) 
This allows us to define the limit 
r(t) = lim Pr(t :::; t < t' I T ~ t) / (t' - t) 
t'~ t 
and we arrive at the central concept of the transition rate. This concept obviously 
provides the possibility of giving a local, time-related description of how the process 
(defined by a single episode) evolves over time. We can interpret r(t) as the propensity 
to change the state, from origin j to destination k, at t. But one should note that this 
propensity is defined in relation to a risk set, the risk set at t, i.e. the set of individuals 
who can experience the event because they have not already had the event before 
t. Having introduced the basic concept of a transition rate, we can finally formulate our 
basic modeling approach. The preliminary description in (1.1) can now be restated in 
a somewhat more precise form as 
r(t) = g(t,x) (1.4) 
This is the basic form of a transition rate model. The central idea is to make the 
transition rate, which describes a process evolving in time, dependent on time and on 
a set of covariates, x. Obviously, we also need the "variable" time (t) on the right-hand 
side of the model equation. However, it must be stressed that a sensible causal 
relation can only be assumed for the dependency of the transition rate on the 
covariates. The causal reasoning underlying the modeling approach (1.4) is 
As a causal effect, the changes in some covariates in the past may lead to changes 
in the transition rate in the future, which in turn describe the propensity that the units 
under study will change in some presupposed state space. As discussed above, this 
causal interpretation requires that we take the temporal order in which the process 
evolves very seriously. At any given point in time, t, the transition rate r(t) can be 
made dependent on conditions that happened to occur in the past, i.e. before t, but 
not on what is the case at t or in the future after t. With respect to these individuals, 
and while the process is evolving, there is always a distinction in past, present, and 
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future. This is particularly important for a causal view of the process. The past 
conditions the present, and what happens in the present shapes the future. There are 
many possibilities to specify the functional relationship g(.) in (1.4) (see Blossfeld and 
Rohwer 1995). 
It is sometimes argued that sociologists should give up the causal analytical point of 
view in favor of a systems view because the operation of causal forces is mutually 
interdependent and variables change each other more or less simultaneously in many 
systems (Marini and Singer 1988). However, even in systems of interdependent 
processes time does not run backwards, and change in one of the interdependent 
variables will take (at least a small amount of) time to produce a change in another 
one. Thus, in systems of variables there cannot be any simultaneity of causes and 
their effects. This allows to demonstrate that a causal approach to interdependent 
systems is possible with the help of the transition rate concept (see Blossfeld and 
Rohwer 1995). In other words, the systems view is not a substitute for a proper causal 
approach in our field (Kelly and McGrath 1988). 
Since the transition rate is indeed an abstraction, it is necessary to relate it back to 
quantities that are directly observable, that is to frequencies of state occupancies at 
particular points in time. To support such inferences, some additional statistical 
concepts are useful which are extensively described by Blossfeld and Rohwer (1995). 
3. Causal Modeling and Observation Plans 
Over the last 20 years, social scientists have been collecting event history data with 
increasing frequency. This is not an accidental trend, nor does it reflect a prevailing 
type of fashion in survey research. Instead, as discussed in the previous section, it 
indicates a growing recognition among social scientists that event history data is often 
the most appropriate empirical information one can get for a causal analysis. 
To colleet data generated by a continuous-time, discrete-state substantive process, 
different observation plans have been used (Coleman 1981; Tuma and Hannan 1984). 
With regard to the extent of detail about the process of change, one can distinguish 
between cross-sectional data, panel data, event count data, event sequence data, and 
event history data. 
In this paper, we will not discuss event count data (see Barron 1993), which simply 
record the number of different types of events for each unit (e.g. the number of 
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upward, downward, or lateral moves in the employment career in aperiod of 10 
years), and event sequence data, which document the sequence of states occupied 
by each unit, as they are rarely used in the social sciences. On the other hand, 
cross-sectional data and panel data are standard sociological data types (Tuma and 
Hannan 1984). It is, therefore, particularly intriguing to compare event history data with 
cross-sectional and panel data. We will use the example shown in Figure 3. In this 
figure, an individual's family career is observed in a cross-sectional survey, a panel 
survey and an event-oriented survey. 
Cross-Sectional Data 
Let us first discuss the cross-sectional observation. In the social sciences, this is the 
most common form of data for assessing the determinants of behavior. The family 
history of the individual in Figure 3 is represented by one single point in time: his or 
her marital state at the time of interview. Thus, a cross-sectional sam pie is only a 
"snapshot" of the substantive process being studied. The point in time when research-
ers take that II picture" is normally not determined by hypotheses about the dynamics 
of the substantive process itself, but by external considerations like getting research 
funds, finding an appropriate institute to conduct the survey etc. 
State space 
married 
consensual union 
single 
State space 
married 
consensual union 
single 
State space 
married 
consensual union 
single 
a) Cross-sectional sampie 
Timet 
b) Panel with 4 waves 
I 
t2 Timet 
c) Event oriented design 
t4 Time t 
Figure 3 Observation of an individual's family career on the basis of a cross-
sectional survey, a panel study md an event history oriented design. 
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Co/eman (1981) has demonstrated that one must be cautious in drawing inferences 
about exp/anatory variables on the basis of such data because, imp/icit/y or explicitly, 
socia/ researchers m ust assume that the substantive process under study is in some 
kind of statistica/ equilibrium. Statistica/ equilibrium or stability of the process means 
that whi/st individuals (or any other unit of analysis) may change their states over time, 
the state probabilities are fairly trendless or stable. Therefore, an equilibrium of the 
process requires that the inflows to and the outflows from each of the discrete states 
be equal over time to a large extent. It is only in such cases that one can reasonably 
assess the estimates of JQQl! and 109-1 inear analyses, as shown by Coleman (1981). 
However, these estimates are ambiguous because they on/y represent the net 
differences in the effects of independent variables (Coleman 1981; Blossfeld and 
Rohwer 1995). If there is no equilibrium in the process, cross-sectional coefficients 
may not only be ambiguous, but even present a completely misleadin9 picture. In a 
recent study on unemployment incidence, Rosenthai (1991), for example, demon-
strates how confusing cross-sectional estimates can be if the unemployment rate 
increases or decreases in a specific region and if the process of change is, therefore, 
not in equilibrium. 
In the social sciences one can expect that stability is very rare. For example, life 
history studies (Mayer 1990; Blossfeld 1989, 1995a, 1995b) show that change across 
age, cohort and historical period is an enduring and important feature in all domains 
of modern individuals' lives (Mayer and Tuma 1990); organizational studies demon-
strate that most social organizations seem to follow a program of growth and not of 
stability; and most modern societies reveal an accelerating rate of change in almost 
all of their subsystems (cf. the rapid changes in family systems, job structures, 
educational systems etc., see Heinz 1991 a, 1991 b, 1992; Mayer 1990; Blossfeld 1989, 
1995a, 1995b). But even in areas considered to be fairly stab/e, one must ask the 
crucial methodological question: to what extent is the process under study close to an 
equilibrium (Tuma and Hannan 1984)? This question can only be answered if 
longitudinal data are applied, as longitudinal data are the only type of data which 
indicate whether a steady state actually exists, or how long it will take until a system 
returns to a new equilibrium after some external upheaval. 
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Beyond the crucial assumption of process stability, cross-sectional data have many 
inferential limitations with regard to causal modeling. We want to address at least 
some of the more important problems here.13 
Direction of causality. There are only a few situations in which the direction of 
causality can be established based on cross-sectional data (Davies 1987). For 
example, consider the strong positive association between parental socioeconomic 
characteristics and educational attainment of sons and daughters, controlling for other 
important influences (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993). A convincing interpretation of this 
effect might be that being born into amiddie class family increases the likelihood of 
attaining a university degree because one is unable to think of any other plausible 
explanation for the statistical association. However, such recursive relationships, in 
which all the causal linkages run 1I0ne way" and have no "feedback" effects, are rare 
in social science research. For example, there is very often an association between 
the age of the youngest child and female labor force participation in modern 
industrialized societies (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). The common interpretation is 
that there is a one-way causality with young children tending to keep mothers at home. 
However, it is quite possible that the lack of jobs encourages women to enter into 
marriage and motherhood, suggesting a reversed relationship (Davies 1987). 
The ambiguity of causation seems to be particularly important for the modeling of the 
relationship between attitudes and behavior. There are two interesting aspects of this 
relationship: there is a direct effect in which behavior affects attitudes, and there is a 
"feedback" process where attitudes change behavior (Davies 1987). Footnote: The 
relationship between attitudes and behavior suggests that there is some kind of inertia 
(or positive feedback) which means that the probability of a specific behavior increases 
as a monotonic function of attitudes and attitudes depend on previous behavior 
(Davies and Crouchley 1985). The well-known disputes among sociologists, as to 
whether value change engenders change in social structure, or whether structural 
change leads to changing values of i individuals, often originates from the fact that 
cross-sectional surveys can only assess the net association of these two processes. 
Various strengths of reciprocal effects. Connected with the inability of establishing the 
direction of causality in cross-sectional surveys is the drawback that these data cannot 
be used to discover the different strengths of reciprocal effects. For example, many 
demographic studies have shown that first marriage and first motherhood are closely 
interrelated (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991). To understand what has been happening 
13 These problems are however not mutually exclusive. 
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with regard to family formation in modern societies, it might be of interest not only to 
know the effect of marriage on birth rates, but also the effect of pregnancy or first birth 
on getting married (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Blossfeld 1995a); and perhaps, how 
these effects have changed over historical time (Manting 1994). 
Observational data. Most sociological research is based on nonexperimental 
observations of social processes and these processes are highly selective. For 
example, Lieberson (1985) in a study examining the influence of type of school 
(private vs. public) on test performance among students distinguished at least three 
types of non-random processes: (1) there is self-selectivity, in which the units of 
analysis sort themselves out by choice (e.g. specific students choose specific types 
of schools); (2) there is selective assignment by the independent variable itself, which 
determines, say, what members of a population are exposed to specific levels of the 
independent variable (e.g. schools select their students based on their past 
achievement); and (3) there is also selectivity due to forces exogenous to variables 
under consideration at the time (socioeconomic background, ethnicity, gender, 
previous school career, changes of intelligence over age etc.); and many of these 
sources are not only not observed, but effectively unmeasurable. Although no 
longitudinal study will be able to overcome all the problems of identification of causal 
effects, cross-sectional data offer the worst of all opportunities to disentangle the 
effects of the causal factors of interest on the outcome from other forces operating at 
the same time because these data are least informative about the process of change. 
Cross-sectional analysis therefore requires a particularly careful justification, and the 
results must always be appropriately qualified (Davies 1987; Pickies and Davies 1989). 
Previous history. There is one aspect of observational data that deserves special 
attention in the social sciences. Life courses of individuals (and other units of analysis 
like organizations etc.) involve complex and cumulative time-related layers of 
selectivity (Mayer 1991). Therefore, there is a strong likelihood that specific individuals 
have been entering a specific origin state. In particular, life course research has shown 
that the past is an indispensible factor in understanding the present (Heinz 1991 a, 
1991 b, 1992; Mayer 1990). Cross-sectional analysis may be performed with some 
proxy-variables as weil as with assumptions of the causal order and interdependencies 
between the various explanatory variables. However, it is often not possible to 
appropriately trace back the time-related selective processes operating in the previous 
history, as these data are simply not available. Thus, the normal control approaches 
in cross-sectional statistical techniques will rarely be successful in isolating the 
influence of some specific causal force (Lieberson 1985). 
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Age and cohort effects. Cross-sectional data cannot be used to distinguish age and 
cohort effects (Tuma and Hannan 1984; Davies 1987). However, in many social 
science applications it is of substantive importance to know whether the behavior of 
people (e.g. their tendency to vote for a specific party) is different because they belong 
to different age groups or whether they are members of different birth cohorts 
(Blossfeld 1986, 1989). 
Historical settings. Cross-sectional data are not able to take into account the fact that 
processes emerge in particular historical settings. For example, in addition to individual 
resources (age, education, labor force experience etc.), there are at least two ways 
in which achanging labor market structure affects career opportunities. The first is that 
people start their careers in different structural contexts. It has often been assumed 
that these specific historie conditions at the point of entry into the labor market have 
a substantial impact upon people's subsequent careers. This kind of influence is 
generally called a cohort effect (Glenn 1977). The second way that changing labor 
market structure influences career opportunities is that it improves or worsens the 
career prospects of all people within the labor market at a given time. For example, 
in a favorable economic situation with low unemployment, there will be a relatively 
wide range of opportunities. This kind of influence is generally called aperiod effect 
(Mason and Fienberg 1985). With longitudinal data, Blossfeld (1986) has shown that 
lifecourse, cohort, and period effects can be identified based on substantively 
developed measures of these concepts (Rodgers 1982), and that these effects 
represent central mechanisms of career mobility that must be distinguished. 
Multiple clocks, historical eras and point-in-time events. From a theoretical or 
conceptual point of view, multiple clocks, historical eras and point-in-time events very 
often influence the substantive process being studied (Mayer and Tuma 1990). For 
example, in demographie studies of divorce, types of clocks, such as age of 
respondent, time of cohabitation, duration of marriage, ages of children, as weil as 
different phases in the state of the business cycle, or changes in national (divorce) 
laws are of importance (Blossfeld, Oe Rose, Hoem, and Rohwer 1993). With respect 
to cross-sectional data, such relationships can hardly be studied without making strong 
untestable assumptions. 
Contextual processes at different levels. Social scientists are very often interested in 
the influences of contextual processes at different aggregation levels (Huinink 1989). 
Contextual process effects refer to situations where changes in the group contexts 
themselves influence the dependent variable. For example, career mObility of an 
individual may be conceptualized as being dependent on changes in resources at the 
individual level (e.g. social background, educational attainment, experience etc.), the 
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success of the firm in which he/she is employed (e.g. expansion or contraction of the 
organization) at the intermediate level, and changes in the business cycle at the macro 
level (Blossfeld 1986; DiPrete 1993). Cross-sectional data do not provide an adequate 
opportunity for the study of such influences at different levels (Mayer and Turna 1990). 
Duration dependence. Another problem of cross-sectional data is that they are 
inherently ambiguous with respect to their interpretation at the level of the unit of 
observation. Suppose we know that in the Federal Republic of Germany, 30.6 per cent 
of employed women were working part-time in 1970 (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). At 
the one extreme, this might be interpreted to imply that each employed woman had 
a 30.6 per cent chance of being employed part-time in this year, but on the other, one 
could infer that 30.6 per cent of the employed women always worked part-time and 
69.4 per cent were full-timers only. In other words, cross-sectional data do not convey 
information about the time women spent in these different employment forms. They 
are therefore open to quite different substantive interpretations (Heckman and Willis 
1977; Flinn and Heckman 1982). In the first case, each woman would be expected to 
move back and forth between part-time and full-time employment. In the second, there 
is no mobility between part-time and full-time work, and the estimated percentages 
describe the proportions of two completely different groups of employed women. From 
an analytical point of view, it is therefore important to have data about durations in a 
state. Also, repeated cross-sectional analysis using comparable sampies of the same 
population (e.g. aseries of microcensuses or cross-sectional surveys), can only show 
net change, not the flow of individuals. 
Variability in state dependencies. In many situations cross-sectional data are 
problematic because the rate of change is strongly state dependent and entries into 
and exits from these states are highly variable over time (e.g. over the life course and 
historical period or ac ross cohorts). For example, it is well-known that the roles of 
wives and mothers (the latter in particular) have been central in women's lives. 
Therefore, the fam ily cycle concept has frequently been used in sociology to describe 
significant changes in the circumstances which affect the availability of women for paid 
work outside the home. The basic idea is that there is a set of ordered stages primarily 
defined by variations in family composition and size that could be described with 
cross-sectional data. However, this view often leads to the tendency to assume that 
what happens to different women in various phases in the family cycle at one point in 
time is sim ilar to the pattern that women experience when they make these transitions 
in different historical times (which has been called the "life course fallacy"). Moreover, 
there is the well-known problem that individuals and families often fail to conform to 
the assumption of a single progression through a given number of stages in a 
predetermined order. At least three reasons for this may exist (Murphy 1991): (1) the 
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chronology of timing of events may not conform to the ideal model, for example 
childbearing may start before marriage; (2) many stages are not reached, for example, 
by never-married persons; and (3) the full set of stages may be truncated by events 
such as death or marital breakdown. Such complex constellations between the family 
cycle and women's labor force participation could hardly be meaningfully described or 
studied on the basis of cross-sectional data (see also Blossfeld 1995b). 
Changes in outcomes. Cross-sectional models very often have a tendency to 
over-predict change and consistently over-estimate the importance of explanatory 
variables (Davies 1987). The reason for this phenomenon is that these analyses 
cannot be based on how changes in explanatory variables engender changes in 
outcomes. They are only concerned with how levels of explanatory variables "explain" 
an outcome at a specific point in time. However, if an outcome at time t (e.g. ehoice 
of mode of travel to work in June) is dependent on a previous outcome (e.g. 
established choice of mode of travel to work), and if both outeomes are positively 
influeneed in the same way by an explanatory variable (e.g. merits of public transport), 
then the effeet of the explanatory variable will reflect both the true positive influence 
of the explanatory variable on the outcome at time t and a positive spurious element . 
due to that variable acting as a proxy for the omitted earlier outeome (established 
mode of travel to work). Thus, a cross-sectional analysis of the travel to work choice 
(e.g. public vs. private transport) would have a tendency to overprediet the effect of 
policy changes (e.g. fare increases or faster buses) beeause there is a strong 
behavioral inertia (Davies 1987). 
These examples show that cross-sectional data have many severe inferential 
limitations for social scientists. Therefore, it is not surprising that causal eonclusions 
based on cross-sectional data have often been radically alte red after the processes 
were studied with longitudinal data (Lieberson 1985). 
Longitudinal studies also have a m uch greater power than cross-seetional ones, both 
in the estimation of bias from missing data, and in the means for correeting it. This is 
because in longitudinal studies one often has data from previous points in time, thus 
enabling the characteristics of non-responders or lost units to be assessed with some 
precision. It is noteworthy that almost all the substantive knowledge concerning the 
biases associated with missing data, whieh all studies must seek to minimize, is 
derived from longitudinal studies (Medical Research Council 1992). 
Although longitudinal data are no panacea, they are obviously more effective in causal 
analysis and have less inferential limitations (Magnusson, Bergmann and Torestad 
1991; Arminger, Clogg and Sobel 1995; Clogg and Arminger 1993; Blossfeld 1995a, 
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1995b; Mayer 1990; Mayer and Tuma 1990). They are indispensable for the study of 
processes over the life course (of all types of units) and their relation to historical 
change. Therefore, research designs aimed at a causal understanding of social 
processes should be based on longitudinal data at the level of the units of analysis. 
Panel Data 
The temporal data most often available to sociologists are panel data, for which the 
same persons or units are re-interviewed or observed at aseries of discrete points in 
time (Chamberlain 1984; Hsiao 1986; Arminger and Muller 1990; Engel and Reinecke 
1994). Figure 3 shows four-wave panel in which the family career of the respondent 
was observed at four different points in time. This means that there is only information 
on states of the units at pre-determined survey points, but the course of the events 
between the survey points remains unknown. 
Panel data normally contain more information than cross-sectional data, but involve 
well-known distortions created by the method itself (see, e.g., Magnusson and 
Bergmann 1990; Hunt 1985): 
Panel bias. Respondents often answer many questions differently in the second and 
later waves than they did the first time; perhaps this is because they are less inhibited, 
or they mulled over or discussed the issues between questioning dates. 
Modification of processes. Panels tend to influence the very phenomena they seek to 
observe - this changes the natural history of the processes being observed. 
Regression to the mean. During the first panel wave, some panel members answer 
specific questions a bit differently than they normally would, due to chance circum-
stances at the time of measurement. For example, when a respondent has some 
problems during the first observation, he/she may perform poorly on some topics, but 
will report more accurately at the next panel wave. This phenomenon, known as 
"regression to the mean," can easily be mistaken by researchers for specific trends. 
Attrition of the sam pie. In panel studies the composition of the sampie normaliy 
diminishes selectively as time goes by. Therefore, what researchers observe in the 
panel may not give a true view of what has happened to their original sam pie. 
Non-responses and missing data. In a cross-sectional analysis, one can afford to 
throw out a small number of cases with linon-responses" and "missing data," but in a 
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long-term longitudinal study, throwing out incomplete cases at each round of 
observations can eventually leave a severely pruned sam pie having very different 
characteristics from the original one. 
Fallacy of cohort centrism. Very often panel studies are focused on members of a 
specific cohort (cf., for example, the British National Child Study). In other words, 
these panels study respondents that were born in, grew up in, and have lived in a 
particular segment of history. There is therefore a danger that researchers might 
assume that what happens to a particular group of people over time reveals general 
principles of the life course (fallacy of cohort centrism). Many events may simply be 
specific for that generation. 
Fallacy of period centrism. Many panel studies include just a few waves and, 
therefore, cover only a short period of historical time (cf. the German Socio-Economic 
Panel which now covers 10 years). At the time of a particular observation, special 
conditions may ex ist and this can result in an individual responding differently than 
he/she normally would (fallacy of historical period). 
Confounded age, period and cohort effects. In any long-term panel study in sociology, 
three causal factors - individual's age, cohort, and period effect - are confounded (cf. 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics). Analytical techniques are necessary to 
unconfound these three factors and reveal the role of each. As discussed in more 
detail below, panel data do have some specific problems unconfounding the three 
major factors. However, for gaining scientific insights into the interplay of processes 
governing life courses from birth to death, they appear to be a better approach than 
applying cross-sections. But a mechanical and atheoretical cohort analysis is a useless 
exercise and statistical innovations alone will not solve the age-period-cohort problem 
(Blossfeld 1986; Mayer and Huinink 1990). 
Most of the above-mentioned difficulties concerning panel studies can be dealt with 
by sophisticated statistical procedures or more panel waves. However, panel data also 
lead to aseries of deficiencies with respect to the estimation of transition rates (Tuma 
and Hannan 1984): first, there is the problem of "embeddability," which means that 
there may be difficulties in embedding a matrix of observed transition probabilities 
within a continuous-time Markov process (Singer and Spilerman 1976a); second, there 
is the problem that there may be no unique matrix of transition rates describing the 
data (Singer and Spilerman 1976b); and third, there is the drawback that the observed 
matrix of transition probabilities may be very sensitive to sampling and measurement 
error (Tuma and Hannan 1984). Multiple waves with irregular spacing or shorter 
intervals between waves can reduce these problems. However, as Hannan and Tuma 
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(1979) have noted, the more panel and event history data resemble each other, the 
less problematic modeling becomes. 
Lazarsfeld (1948, 1972) was among the first sociologists to propose panel analysis of 
discrete variables. In particular, he wanted to find a solution to the problem of 
ambiguity in causation. He suggested that if one wants to know whether a variable X 
induces change in another variable Y, or whether Y induces change in X, observations 
of X and Y at two points in time would be necessary. Lazarsfeld applied this method 
to dichotomous variables whose time-related structure he analyzed in a resulting 
sixteenfold table. Later on, Goodman (1973) applied log-linear analysis to such tables. 
For many years, such a cross-Iagged panel analysis for qualitative and quantitative 
variables (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Shingles 1976) was considered to be a 
powerful quasi-experimental method of making causal inferences. It was also extended 
to multiwave-multivariable panels to study more complex path models with structural-
equation models (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993). However, it appears that the strength 
of the panel design for causal inference was hugely exaggerated (Davis 1978). Causal 
inferences in panel approaches are m uch more complicated than has been generally 
realized. Several reasons are responsible for this: 
Time until the effect starts to occur. As discussed above, it is important to realize that 
the role of time in causal explanations does not only lie in specifying a temporal order 
in which the effect follows the cause in time. It additionally means that a temporal 
interval is necessary for the cause to have an impact (Kelly and McGrath 1988). The 
time interval may be short or long, but can never be zero or infinity (Kelly and McGrath 
1988). In most of the current sociological theories and interpretations of research 
findings this interval is left unspecified. In most cases, at least implicitly, researchers 
assume that the effect takes place almost immediately. Of course, if this is the case, 
then there seems to be no need for theoretical statements about the time course of 
causal effects. A single measurement of the effect at some point in time after a cause 
has been imposed might be sufficient for catching it (see Figure 1 a). However, if there 
is a reason to assume that there is a .@g between cause and effect, then a single 
measurement of the outcome is inadequate for describing the process (see Figure 1 b); 
and the interpretation arrived at on the basis of that single measurement will be a 
function of the point in time chosen to measure the effect. Thus, a restrictive (implicit) 
assumption of panel designs is that either cause and effect occur almost simulta-
neously, or the interval between observations is of approximately the same length as 
the true causal lag. The greater the discrepancy, the greater the likelihood that the 
panel analysis will fail to discover the true causal process. Thus, as expressed by 
Davis (1978), if one does not know the causal lag exactly, panel analysis is not of 
much utility to establish causal direction or time sequencing of causal effects. 
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Unfortunately, we rarely, if ever, have enough information about the detailed structure 
of a social process to specify the true lag precisely. 
Temporal shapes of the unfolding effect. While the problem of time-Iags is widely 
recognized in sociology, there is almost no discussion with respect to the temporal 
shapes of effects (Kelly and McGrath 1988) (see Figure 1). If the effect increases or 
decreases monotonically (Figure 1 c) or linearly, oscillates in cycles (Figure 1.e), or 
shows any other complicated time-related pattern, then the strength of the observed 
effect is dependent on the timing of the J2anel waves. A panel design might be 
particularly problematic if there are non-monotonic cycles of the effect, because totally 
opposite conclusions about the effects of the explanatory variable can be arrived at, 
depending on whether the panel places measurement points at a peak or at an ebb 
in the curve (see Figures 1 d and 1 e). 
Reciprocal effects with different time-paths. In cases of reciprocal causality, additional 
problems will arise if the time structure of the effects of X1 on X2 and of X2 on X1 are 
different with respect to lags and shapes. In these situations, a panel design might turn 
out to be completely useless for those wishing to detect such time-related recursive 
relationships. 
Observational data and timing of measurement of explanatory variables. Most 
sociological research is based on observational data, meaning that manipulation of the 
timing of the independent variables is generally not possible. For example, if the 
researcher is going to study the effects of job mobility on marriage behavior, it is 
impossible to force respondents to change their jobs, say, at the time of the first panel 
wave. Thus, the longer the interval between panel waves, the more uncerta.inty there 
will be regarding the exact point in time when an individual moved to another job and 
therefore about the point we evaluate in the time-path of the effect (Coleman 1981). 
The situation may be even more problematic if changes in independent variables are 
repeatable and several changes are possible between two successive panel waves, 
as might be the case with job shifts observed in yearly intervals (cf. Sandefur and 
Tuma 1987). In such panel studies, even the causal order of explanatory and 
dependent events may become ambiguous. 
Observational data and the timing of control variables. Observational studies take 
place in natural settings and, therefore, offer little control over changes in other 
important variables and their timing. If these influences change arbitrarily and have 
time-related effect patterns, then panel studies are useless in disentangling the effect 
of interest from time-dependent effects of other parallel exogenous processes. 
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Continuous changes of explanatory and control variables. In observational studies, 
explanatory and control variables may not only change stepwise from one state to 
another, but can often change continuously over time. For example, individuals 
continuously change age, constantly acquire general labor force experience or 
job-specific human capital if they are employed (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991), are 
exposed to continuously changing historical conditions (Blossfeld 1986), are steadily 
changing their social relationships in marital or consensual unions (Blossfeld, Oe Rose, 
Hoem, and Rohwer 1993), etc. Even in cases where these continuous changes are 
not connected with lags or time-related effect patterns, there are deficiencies of panel 
data concerning their capabilities of detecting time dependence in substantive 
processes. This is why panel analysis can often not appropriately identify age, period, 
and cohort effects (Blossfeld 1986). 
Therefore, the use of panel data causes an identification problem due to omitted 
factors whose effects are summarized in a disturbance term. These factors are not 
stable over time, which means that the disturbance term cannot be uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables. Panel analysis therefore critically depends on solutions to 
the problem of autocorrelation. This problem can be reasonably weil tackled by 
increasing the number of panel waves and modifying their spacing. Panel analysis is 
particularly sensitive to the length of the time intervals between waves relative to the 
speed of the process (Coleman 1981). They can be too short, so that too few events 
will be observed, or too long, so that it is difficult to establish a time-order between 
events (Sandefur and Tuma 1987). A major advantage of the continuous-time 
observation design in event history analysis is therefore that it makes the timing 
between waves irrelevant (Coleman 1968). 
Event History Oata 
For many processes in the social sciences, a continuous measurement of qualitative 
variables seems to be the only adequate method of assessing empirical change. This 
is achieved by utilizing an event oriented observation design which records all the 
changes in qualitative variables and their tim ing. As shown in Figure 3, the major 
advantage of event history data is that they provide the most complete data possible 
on changes in qualitative variabies which may occur at any point in time. The 
observation of events therefore provides an attractive alternative to the observation of 
states for social scientists. 
Event history data, mostly collected retrospectively via life history studies, covers the 
whole life course of individuals. An example for such a study is the German Life 
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History Study (GLHS, Mayer and Brückner 1989). Retrospective studies have the 
advantage of normally being cheaper to collect than panel data. They are also 
systematically coded to one framework of codes and meanings (Dex 1991). But 
retrospective (in contrast to prospective) studies suffer from several limitations that 
have been increasingly acknowledged (Medical Research Council 1992): 
Non-factual data. It is well-known that retrospective questions concerning motivational, 
attitudinal, cognitive, or affective states are particularly problematic because the 
respondents can hardly recall the timing of changes in these states accurately 
(Hannan and Tuma 1979). This type of data is not verifiable even in principle, as these 
states exist only in the minds of the respondents and are only directly accessible, if 
at al/, to the respondent concerned (Sudman and Bradburn 1986). For these 
non-factual data, panel studies have the advantage of being able to repeatedly record 
current states of the same individual over time. Thus, for studies aiming to model the 
relationship between attitudes and behavior over time, panel observations of attitudinal 
states, combined with retrospective information on behavioral events since the last 
sweep, appear to be an appropriate design. 
Recall problems with regard to behavior or facts. Behavioral or factual questions ask 
the respondents about characteristics, things they have done, or things that have 
happened to them which in principle are verifiable by an external observer. Most 
surveys (cross-sectional, panel or event oriented) elicit retrospective information on 
behavior or facts (e.g. by asking people about their education, social origin etc.), so 
that the disadvantages of retrospection are only a matter of degree. However, event 
history studies are particularly ambitious (see Mayer and Brückner 1989). They try to 
collect continuous records of qualitative variables that have a high potential for bias 
because of their strong reliance on memory. However, research on the accuracy of 
retrospective data shows that individuals' marital and fertility histories, family 
characteristics and education, health service usage, and employment history can be 
collected to a reasonable degree of accuracy. A very good overview concerning the 
kinds of data which can be retrospectively col/ected, the factors affecting recall 
accuracy, and the methods improving recall has been presented by Shirley Dex 
(1991 ). 
Unknown factors. Retrospective designs cannot be used to study factors involving 
variables that are not known to the respondent (e.g. emotional and behavioral 
problems when the respondent was a child). In such cases, panel studies are 
indispensable (Medical Research Council 1992). 
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Limited capacity. There is a limit to respondents' tolerance for the amount of data 
which can be collected on one occasion (Medical Research Council 1992). A carefully 
corsetted panel design can therefore provide a broader coverage of variables (if these 
are not unduly influenced by variations at the time of assessment). 
Only survivors. Due to their nature, retrospective studies must be based on survivors. 
Thus, those subjects who have died or migrated from the geographical area under 
study will necessarily be omitted. If either is related to the process (as often may be 
the case), biases will arise. This problem is particularly important for retrospective 
studies involving a broad range of birth cohorts, like the GLHS or international 
migration studies (Btossfeld 1987). 
Misrepresentation of specific populations. Retrospective studies also systematically 
misrepresent specific populations. For example, Duncan (1966) has shown that if men 
are asked about their fathers, men from earlier generations who had no sons, or 
whose sons died or emigrated are not represented in a retrospective father-son 
mobility table. 
4. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to show that - compared to alternative observation 
plans - the collection of event history data is an extremely useful approach for 
uncovering causal relationships or mapping out systems of causal relations. Event 
history models provide a natural basis for a causal understanding of social processes 
because they relate the change in future outcomes to conditions in the past at each 
point in time and enable the researcher to predict future changes on the basis of past 
observations at each moment of the process (Aalen 1987). 
In the past, event history data normally have been collected retrospectively leading to 
specific problems described above. To avoid these problems (or to diminsh their 
relevance), a mixed design employing a follow-up (or "catch-up") and a follow-back 
strategy appears to combine the strengths of panel designs with the virtues of 
retrospective studies. Therefore, in modern panel studies event histories are collected 
retrospectively for the period before the panei started and between the successive 
panel waves. Sometimes, complete administrative records also contain time-related 
information about events in the past. In any case, with regard to cross-sectional and 
tranditional panel data, all of these procedures (retrospective, combined follow-up and 
back-up, or available registers) ofter a comparatively superior opportunity for modeling 
social processes, regardless of which method is selected. 
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1. Introduction 
The rnvestigation of causal relationships is an important but difficult scientific endeavor. 
The opportunity for assessing causal inferences varies strongly with the type of 
observation available to the social scientist. This is because the data structure 
determines the extent to which the researcher is forced to make untested assumptions 
when he or she is trying to establish relevant empirical evidence that can serve as a 
link in a chain of reasoning about causal mechanisms (Goldthorpe 1994). 
In this paper, we first discuss the role of time in causal inferences in the social 
sciences. This will help us to recast a number of research problems so that 
fundamental design issues can be addressed more directly. Then, based on various 
examples, we will describe in detail how different observation plans (cross-secional, 
panel, and event history oriented) affect causal analysis. Although longitudinal data are 
no panacea, they are obviously more effective in causal analysis and have less 
inferential lim itations. 
We will limit our attention to data generated by continuous-time, discrete-state 
substantive processes. These processes have been characterized by James Coleman 
(1981 :6) in the following general way: (1) there are units - which may be individuals, 
organizations, societies, or whatever - that change from one discrete state to another; 
(2) these changes (or events) can occur at any point in time and are not restricted to 
predetermined points in time; and (3) there are time-constant and/or time-dependent 
factors influencing the events. Examples of such process type can be given for a wide 
variety of social research fields (see, e.g., Blossfeld, Hamerle, and Mayer 1989; 
Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). Consider, for example, a person's job career. The job 
history may be described as the time spent in the first job and the date Ule person 
entered into this speil, the type and duration in the following job or the kind of non-
employment and its duration, and so on. 
2. Causal Statements in the Social Sciences 
In this section, we will focus on the general role of time in causal inferences and also 
show that the idea of a causal effect can be represented as a change in the transition 
rate, if the dependent variable is discrete and can change its state at any time. 
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Correlation and Causation 
To begin with, statements about causation should be distinguished from statements 
about association. In making correlational inferences, one can be satisfied to observe 
how the values of one variable are associated with the values of other variables over 
the population under study and perhaps over time. In this context, time is only 
important insofar as it determines the population under analysis or specifies the 
operational meaning of a particular variable (Holland 1986). Statements about 
associations describe what has happened. They are quite different from causal 
statements and are designed to give information about how events are produced or 
conditioned by other events. 
Sometimes social scientists argue that because the units of sociological analysis 
continuously learn and change and involve actors with goals and beliefs, sociology can 
at best only provide systematic descriptions of phenomena at various points in history. 
This position is based on the view that causal statements about events are only 
possible if they are regulated by "eternal,1I time-Iess laws (Kelly and McGrath 1988). 
Of course, the assumption that such laws can be established with regard to social 
processes can reasonably be disputed. However, we are not forced to accept a simple 
contrast: either describing contingent events or assum ing "eternal" laws. Many social 
phenomena show systematic temporal variations and patterned regularities under 
specific conditions that themselves are a legitimate focus of our efforts to understand 
social change (Kelly and McGrath 1988). Thus, sociology can do more than just 
describe the social world. This paper therefore emphasizes the usefulness of 
techniques of event history modeling as IInew" approaches to the investigation of 
causal explanations. 1 
Causal Mechanisms and Substantive Theory 
The identification of causal mechanisms has been one of the classic concerns in 
sociology. Causal statements are made -to explain the occurrence of events, to 
understand why particular events happen, and to make predictions when the situation 
changes (Marini and Singer 1988). Although sociologists sometimes seem to be 
1 We speak of a "new" approach just to emphasize the contrast to traditional"causal 
analysis" based on structural equation models which are basically time-Iess models. 
See the discussion in Bollen (1989), Campbell, Mutran and Parker (1987), or 
Faulbaum and Bentier (1994). 
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opposed to using the word IIcause,1I they are far less reluctant to apply very similar 
words like IIforce,1I lIagency,1I or IIcontrol, 11 when trying to understand social phenomena. 
There is consensus in the fact that causal inferences cannot simply and directly be 
made trom empirical data, regardless of whether they are collected through ingenious 
research designs or summarized by particularly advanced statistical models. Thus, 
using event history observation plans and event history analysis models per se will not 
allow us to prove causality, as is the case for all other statistical techniques. However, 
as we will see in the next section, event-oriented observation designs offer richer 
information and, as we will try to demonstrate in this paper, event history models 
provide more appropriate techniques for exploring causal relations. 
It seems useful to treat causality as being a property of theoretical statements rather 
than the empirical world itself (Goldthorpe 1994). In sociology, causal staternents are 
based primarily on substantive hypotheses which the researcher develops about the 
social world. In this sense, causal inference is theoretically driven (Freedman 1991) 
and it will always reflect the changing state of sociological knowledge in a field. 2 Of 
course, descriptive statements are also dependent on theoretical views guiding the 
selection processes and providing the categories underlying every description. The 
crucial point is however that causal statements need a theoretical argument specifying 
the particular mechanism of how a cause produces an effect or, more generally, in 
which way interdependent forces affect each other in a given setting over time. 
Therefore, the important task of event history modeling is not to demonstrate causal 
processes directly, but to establish relevant empirical evidence that can serve as a link 
in a chain of reasoning about causal mechanisms (Goldthorpe 1994). In this respect, 
event history models might be particularly helpful instruments because they allow a 
time-related empirical representation of the structure of causal arguments. 
Attributes, Causes and Time-Constant Variables 
Holland (1986) tried to establish some links between causal inference and statistical 
modeling. In particular, he emphasized that for a conception of causality it is essential 
that each unit of a population must be exposabl'e to any of the various levels of a 
cause, at least hypothetically. He argues, for example, that the schooling a student 
2 Causal relations are always identified against the background of some field, and 
specification of a field is critical to the identification of an observed relation (Marini 
and Singer 1988). 
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receives can be a cause of the student's performance on a test, whereas the student's 
race or sex cannot. In the former case it seems possible to contemplate measuring 
the causal effect, whereas in the latter cases, where we have the enduring attributes 
of a student, all that can be discussed is association (see also Yamaguchi 1991). 
We agree with Holland that it is essential for causal statements to imply counterfactual 
reasoning: 11 the cause had been different, there would have been another outcome, 
at least with a certain probability. In this sense, counterfactual statements reflect 
imagined situations. It is not always clear, however, which characteristics of a situation 
can sensibly be assumed to be variable, i.e. can be used in counterfactual reasoning, 
and which characteristics should be regarded as fixed. At least to some degree, the 
distinction depends on the field of investigation. For example, from a sociological point 
of view what is important with regard to sex is not the biological attributes per se, but 
the social meaning attached to these attributes. The social meaning of these attributes 
can change regardless of whether their biological basis changes or not. For example, 
societal rules might change to create more equality between the races or sexes. We 
therefore think that in sociological applications counterfactuals can also be meaningful-
Iy applied to such attributes. They can be represented as time-constant "variables" in 
statistical models to investigate their possible impact on some outcome to be 
explained. It is, however, important to be quite explicit about the sociological meaning 
of causal statements which involve references to biological or ethnic attributes. There 
is, for example, no eternal law connecting gender and/or race with wage differentials. 
But probably there are social mechanisms which connect gender and ethnic 
differences with different opportunities in the labor market. 
Causes and Time-Dependent Variables 
The meaning of the counterfactual reasoning of causal statements is that causes are 
states wh ich could be different from what they actually are. However, the consequenc-
es of conditions that could be different from their actual state are obviously not observ-
able.3 It means that it is simply impossible to observe the effect that would have 
happened on the same unit of analysis, if it were exposed to another condition at the 
same time. To find an empirical approach to causal statements, the researcher must 
look at conditions which actually do change in time. These changes are events. More 
formally, an event is a change in a variable, and this change must happen at a specific 
point in time. This implies that the most obvious empirical representation of causes is 
3 Holland (1986) calls this "the fundamental problem of causal inference." 
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in terms of variables that can change their states over time. This statement is linked 
very naturally with the concept of time-dependent covariates in event history analysis. 
The role of a time-dependent covariate in this approach is to indicate that a (qualitative 
or metric) causal factor has changed its state at a specific time and that the unit under 
study is exposed to another causal condition. For example, in the case of gender the 
causal events might be the steps in the acquisition of gender roles over the life course 
or the exposure to sex-specific opportunities in the labor market at a specific historical 
time. Thus, a time-constant variable "gender" should ideally be replaced in an 
empirical analysis by time-changing events assumed to produce sex-specific 
differences in the life history of men and women. Of course, in empirical research that 
is not always possible, so that one very often has to rely on time-constant "variables" 
as weil. However, it is important to recognize that for these variables the implied 
longitudinal causal relation is not exam ined. For example, if we observe an association 
amongst people with different levels of educational attainment and their job 
opportunities, then we can normally draw the conclusion that changes in job 
opportunities are a result of changes in educational attainment level. The implied idea 
is the following: if we started having people with the lowest educational attainment 
level and followed them over the life course, they would presumably differ in their rates 
to attaining higher levels of educational attainment and this would produce changes 
in job opportunities. Whether this would be the case for each individual is not very 
clear from a study that is based on people with different levels of educational 
attainment. In particular, one would expect that the causal relationship between 
education and job opportunities would radically be altered if all people acquired a 
higher (or the highest) level of educational attainment.4 Thus, the two statements - the 
first about associations across different members of a population and the second 
about dependencies in the life course for each individual member of the population -
are quite different; one type of statement can be empirically true while the other one 
can be empirically false. Therefore, statements of the first type cannot be regarded as 
substitutes for statements of the second type. However, since all causal propositions 
have consequences for longitudinal change (see Lieberson 1985), only time-changing 
variables provide the most convincing empirical evidence of causal relations. 5 
4 A longitudinal approach would provide, however, the opportunity to study these 
kinds of changes in the causal relationships over time. 
5 There is also another aspect that is important here (see Lieberson 1985): causal 
relationships can be symmetrie or asymmetrie. In examining the causal influence 
of a change in a variable X on a change in adependent variable V, one has to 
consider whether shifts to a given value of X from either direction have the same 
consequences for V. For example, rarely do researchers consider whether an 
upward shift on the prestige scale, say from 20 to 40, will lead to a different 
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Time Order and Causal Effects 
We can summarize our view of causal statements in the following way: 
~Xt ~ ~ Yt' t < t' 
meaning that a change in variable Xt at time t is a cause of a change in variable Yt' 
at a later point in time, t'. It is not implied, of course, that Xt is the only cause which 
might affect Yt'. So we should speak of causal conditions to stress that there might be, 
and normally is, a quite camplex set of causes. 6 Thus, if causal statements are 
studied empirically, they must intrinsically be related to time. There are three important 
aspects. First, to speak of a change in variables necessarily implies reference to a 
time axis. We need at least two points in time to observe that a variable has changed 
its value. Of course, at least approximately, we can say that a variable has changed 
its value at a specific point in time.? Therefore, we use the symbols to refer to 
changes in the values of the time-dependent variable ~Xt and the state variable ~ Yt 
at time t. This leads to the important point that causal statements relate changes in 
two ( or more) variables. 
outcome of Y (say family decisions) than would a downward shift of X from 60 to 
40. In other words, most researchers assume symmetry. However, even if a change 
is reversible, the causal process may not be. The question is: if a change in a 
variable X causes a change in another one, Y, what happens to Y if X returns to 
its earlier level? "Assuming everything else is constant, a process is reversible, if 
the level of Y also returns to its initial condition; a process is irreversible if Y does 
not return to its earlier level. Observe that it is the process - not the event - that 
is being described as reversible or irreversible." (Lieberson 1985:66) 
6 It is important to note here that the effect of a variable X is always measured 
relative to other causes. A conjunctive plurality of causes occurs if various factors 
must be jointly present to produce an effect. Disjunctive plurality of causes, on the 
other hand, occurs if the effect is produced by each of several factors alone, and 
the joint occurrence of two or more factors does not alter the effect (see the 
extensive discussion in Marini and Singer (1988)). 
? Statements like this implicitly refer to some specification of "point in time. 11 The 
meaning normally depends on the kind of events which are to be described, for 
instance, a marriage, the birth of a child, or to become unemployed. In event history 
text books, normally a continuous time axis for purposes of mathematical modeling 
is assumed (see Blossfeld and Rowher 1995). This should however be understood 
as an idealized way of representing social time. Here we are using mathematical 
concepts to speak about social reality, so we will disregard the dispute about 
whether time is "continuous" (in the mathematical sense of this word), or not. 
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Second, there is a time ordering between causes and effects. The cause must 
precede the effect in time: t < t', in the formal representation given above. This seems 
to be generally accepted.8 As an implication, there must be a temporal interval 
between the change in a variable representing a cause, and a change in the variable 
representing a corresponding effect. It is important to realize that the role of time in 
causal explanations does not only lie in specifying a temporal order in which the effeet 
follows the cause in time. It additionally implies that a temporal interval is necessary 
for the cause to have an impact (Kelly and McGrath 1988). In other words, if the 
cause has to precede the effeet in time, it takes some finite amount of time for the 
cause to produce the effect. The time interval may be very short or very long, but can 
never be zero or infinity (Kelly and McGrath 1988). Some effects take place almost 
instantaneously. For example, if the effect occurs at microseeond intervals, then the 
process must be observed in these small time units to uneover causal relations. 
However, some effects may occur in a time interval too small to be measured by any 
given methods, so that cause and effect seem to oceurat the same point in time. 
Apparent simultaneity is often the case in those social science applications where 
basic observation intervals are relatively crude (e.g. days, months, or even years), 
such as, for example, yearly data about first marriage and first childbirth (Blossfeld, 
Manting and Rohwer 1993). For these parallel processes, the events "first marriage" 
and "first childbirth" may be functionally interdependent, but whether these two events 
are observed simultaneously or successively depends on the degree of temporal 
refinement of the seale used in making the observations. Other effects need a long 
time until they start to occur. Thus, there is a delay or lag between cause and effeet 
that must be specified in an appropriate causal analysis. However, in most of the 
current sociological theories and interpretations of research findings this interval is left 
unspecified. 
This immediately leads to a third point. In addition to the question of how long the 
delay between the timing of the cause and the beginning of the unfolding of the effect 
is, there might be different shapes of how the causal effect Yt unfolds over time. While 
the problem of time-Iags is widely recognized in social science literature, there is 
almost no information with respect to the temporal shapes of effects (Kelly and 
McGrath 1988). Social scientists seem to be quite ignorant with respect to the fact that 
causal effects could be highly time-dependent, too. The panels of Figure 1 illustrate 
several possible shapes these effects may trace over time. In Figure 1 a, there is an 
almost all-at-once change that is then maintained; in Figure 1 b, the effect oecurs with 
some lengthy time-lag and is then time-invariant; in Figure 1 c, the effect starts almost 
8 See, for instance, the discussion in Eells (1991, Ch.,5). 
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Figure 1 Different temporal shapes of how a change in a variable x, occurring at 
point in time tx, effects a change in a variable y. 
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immediately and then gradually increases; in Figure 1 d, there is an almost all-at-once 
increase, which reaches a maximum after some time and then decreases; finally, in 
Figure 1 e, a cyclical effect pattern over time is described. Thus, an appropriate 
understanding of causal relations between variables should take into account that the 
causal relationship itself may change over time. This seems particularly important in 
sociological applications of causal reasoning. In these applications we generally cannot 
rely on the assumption of eternal, time-Iess laws but have to recognize that the causal 
mechanisms may change during the development of social processes. 
Actors and Probabilistic Causal Relations 
It seems agreed that social phenomena are always directly or indirectly based on 
actions of individuals. This clearly separates the social from the natural sciences. 
Sociology therefore does not deal with associations among variables per se, but with 
variables that are associated via acting people. There are at least three consequences 
for causal relations: First, in methodological terms, this means that if individuals relate 
causes and effects through their actions, then research on social processes should at 
best be based on individual longitudinal data (Coleman and Hao 1989; Coleman 
1990). This is why life history data on individuals, and not aggregated longitudinal 
data, provide the most appropriate information for the analyses of social processes. 
Only with these data can one trace the courses of action at the level of each individual 
over time. Second, in theoretical terms it means that the explaining or understanding 
of social processes requires a time-related specification of (1) 
the past and present conditions under which people act,9 (2) the many and possibly 
conflicting goals that they pursue at the present time, (3) the beliefs and expectations 
guiding the behavior, and (4) the actions that probably will follow in the future. lO 
9 These conditions are, of course, heavily molded by social structural regularities in 
the past and the present. Sociology must always be a historical discipline 
(Goldthorpe 1991). 
10 Sometimes it is argued that, since human actors act intentionally and behavior is 
goal-oriented, the intentions or motives of actors to bring about some effect in the 
future causes the actor to behave in a specific way in the present (Marini and 
Singer 1988). This does not however contradict a causal view. One simply has to 
distinguish intentions, motives or plans as they occur in the present from their 
impact on the behavior which follows their formation temporally, and from the final 
result, as an outcome of the behavior. An expectation about a future state of affairs 
should clearly be distinguished from what eventually happens in the future. 
Therefore, the fact that social agents can behave intentionally, based on expecta-
tions, does not reverse the time order underlying our causal statements. 
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Third, if it is people that are doing the acting, then causal inference must also take into 
account the free will of individuals. This introduces an essential element of indetermi-
nacy into causal inferences. This means that in sociology we can only reasonably 
account for and model the generality but not the determinacy of behavior. The aim of 
substantive and statistical models must therefore be to capture common elements in 
the behavior of people, or patterns of action that recur in many cases (Goldthorpe 
1994). This means that in sociological applications randomness has to enter as a 
defining characteristic of causal models. We can only hope to make sensible causal 
statements about how a given or (hypothesized) change in variable ~ in the past 
affects the probability of a change in variable YI' in the future. Correspondingly, the 
basic causal relation becomes 
t < t' (1.1) 
This means that a change in the time-dependent covariate Xt will change the 
probability that the dependent variable YI' will change in the future (t' > t). In sociology, 
this interpretation seems more appropriate than the traditional deterministic approach. 
The essential difference is not that our knowledge about causes is insufficient because 
it only allows probabilistic statements, but that the causal effect to be explained is a 
probability. Thus, probability in this context is not just a technical term anymore, but 
is considered as a theoretical one: it is the propensity of social agents to change their 
behavior. 
Causal Statements and Limited Empirical Observations 
A quite different type of randomness related to making inferences occurs if causal 
statements are applied to real-world situations in the social sciences. There are at 
least four additional reasons to expect further randomness in empirical studies. These 
are basically the same ones that occur in deterministic approaches and are well-known 
from traditional regression modeling (Lieberson 1991). The first one is measurement 
error, a serious problem in empirical social research, which means that the observed 
data deviate somewhat from the predicted pattern without invalidating the causal 
proposition. The second reason is particularly important in the case of non-experiment-
al data. It is often the case that complex multivariate causal relations operate in the 
social world. Thus, a given outcome can occur because of the presence of more than 
one influencing factor. Moreover, it mayaiso not occur at times because the impact 
of one independent variable is outweighed by other influences working in the opposite 
direction. In these situations, the observed influence of the cause is only approximate, 
unless one can control for the other important factors. The third motive is that 
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sociologists often do not know or are not able to measure all of the important factors. 
Thus, social scientists have to relinquish the idea of a complete measurement of 
causal effects, even if they would like to make a deterministic proposition. Finally, 
sometimes chance affects observed outcomes in the social world. It is not important 
here to decide whether chance per se exists or whether it is only a surrogate for the 
poor state of our knowledge of additional influences and/or inadequate measurement. 
In summary, these problems imply that social scientists can only hope to make 
empirical statements with a probabilistic character. This situation normally leads to 
identification problems. Without strong assumptions about missing information and 
errors in the available data, it is generally not possible to find definite statements about 
causal relations (see Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). 
A Simplistic Conception of Causal Relations 
At this point it is important to stress that the concept of causal relation is a rather 
special abstraction implying a time-related structure that does not immediately follow 
from our sensory impressions. Consider the following example in Figure 2 where we 
characterize the necessary time-related observations of a unit being affected by a 
causal effect. This figure shows that an empirical representation of the most simple 
causal effect, (i.e. (1) where the condition Xt changes (from one state Xt1= x1 to 
another one Xt2 = x2) and (2) is then constant afterwards, (3) the change in Yt (from 
Yt2 = Y1 to Yt3 = Y2) takes place almost instantaneously and (4) is then also 
time-constant afterwards) needs at least three points in time where the researcher 
m ust note the states of the independent and dependent variables, respectively.11 Th is 
is because, if we assume that a change in the independent variable Xt has taken place 
at t2, then, to be able to fix the particular change in the condition in the past, we need 
to know the state of the independent variable Xt at an earlier time, t1 (see Figure 2). 
For the dependent variable Yt we need an observation before the effect has started 
to occur. Assuming everything else is constant, this observation can be made, at the 
latest at point t2 because the effect has to follow the cause in time. To evaluate 
whether the hypothesized effect has indeed taken place at a later time, t_3, we must 
again note the state of the dependent variable Yt. Thus, a simplistic representation of 
a causal effect exists when we compare the change in the observations for the 
independent variable in the past and the present with the change in the observations 
11 This example is instructive because Lazarsfeld (1948,1972), and many others after 
him have argued that for causal inferences two observations of the units would be 
sufficient. 
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Figure 2 Observation of a simple causal effect. 
for the dependent variable in the present and in the future and link both changes with 
a substantive argument. 12 
However, this is only a simple and fairly unrealistic example of a causal effect. In the 
case of observational data in the social sciences, where there are many (qualitative 
and metric) causal variables that might change their values at any point in time, when 
their causa I effects might have various delays and different shapes in time (see Figure 
1), then the quantity of the observed causal effect as shown in Figure 1 will strongly 
depend on when the measurements at the three points in time are taken. 
Thus, what can we say about the causal effect(s) at any given point in time if the 
situation is more complex? A paradox occurs: the concept of causal effect depends 
intrinsically on comparisons between changes in both the independent and dependent 
variables in at least three points in time. Yet the concept of causal effect should itself 
reflect astate of a unit of observation at any point in time as being an appropriate one 
in real empirical situations. Thus, what is still needed in our discussion is a concept 
that represents the quantity of the causal effect at any point in time. 
Causal Effects and Changes in Transition Rates 
If the dependent variable is discrete and can change its state at any time, then the 
transition rate framework offers a time-point-related representation for the causal 
effect. We briefly want to develop this idea. 
12 Indeed such a simplistic idea of the causal effect is the basis of all panel designs, 
as shown in the next section. 
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Let us first start with the dependent variable, Yl' and its changes in the future (as a 
consequence of a change in a causal factor). In particular, we are interested in 
changes of states occupied by the units of analysis. The state space is assumed to 
be discrete, and so the possible changes are discrete. We assume that a unit enters 
at time to into the (origin) state j, that is Yto = j. The basic form of change to be 
explained in the transition rate framework is the probability of a change in Yt from an 
origin state j to adestination state k (while t > to)' Now, we need a concept that allows 
describing the development of the process at every point in time, while the process 
is going on, and that, for its definition, only relies on information about the past 
development of the process. The crucial concept that can be used for this purpose is 
the transition rate. To define this concept, let us first introduce a random variable T to 
represent the duration, beginning at to, until a change in the dependent vanable, that 
is a transition from (origin) state j to (destination) state k, occurs. To simplify the 
notation we will assume that to = O. Then, the following probability can be defined: 
Pr(t ::; t < t' I T ~ t) t < t' (1.2) 
This is the probability that an event occurs in the time interval from t to t', given that 
no event (transition) has occurred before, that is, in the interval from 0 to t. This 
probability is weil defined and obviously weil suited to describe the temporal evolution 
of the process. The definition refers to each point in time while the process is evolving, 
and thereby can express the idea of change during its development. Also, the 
definition only relies on information about the past of the process, what has happened 
up to the present point in time, t. Therefore, the concept defined in (1) can sensibly 
be used to describe the process before it has finished for all individuals in the 
population. Assume that we know the probabilities defined in (1.2) for all points in time 
up to a certain point f. Then we have a description of the process up to this point, and 
this description is possible without knowing how the process will develop in the future, 
i.e. for t > f. 
Since our mathematical model is based on a continuous time axis, one can in the 
expression (1.2) let 1'- t approach zero. However, as the length of the time interval 
approaches zero, the concept of change in the dependent variable would simply 
disappear because the probability that a change takes place in an interval of zero 
length is zero: 
lim Pr(t ~ t < t' I T ~ t) = 0 
1'-) t 
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To avoid this, we regard the ratio of the transition probability to the length of the time 
interval to represent the probability of futu re changes in the dependent variable Q§f 
unit of time (Coleman 1968), i.e. we consider 
Pr(t :::; t < t' I T ~ t) / (1'- t) 
This allows us to define the limit 
r(t) = lim Pr(t :::; t < t' I T ~ t) / (t' - t) 
t'~ t 
and we arrive at the central concept of the transition rate. This concept obviously 
provides the possibility of giving a local, time-related description of how the process 
(defined by a single episode) evolves over time. We can interpret r(t) as the propensity 
to change the state, from origin j to destination k, at t. But one should note that this 
propensity is defined in relation to a risk set, the risk set at t, i.e. the set of individuals 
who can experience the event because they have not already had the event before 
t. Having introduced the basic concept of a transition rate, we can finally formulate our 
basic modeling approach. The preliminary description in (1.1) can now be restated in 
a somewhat more precise form as 
r(t) = g(t,x) (1.4) 
This is the basic form of a transition rate model. The central idea is to make the 
transition rate, which describes a process evolving in time, dependent on time and on 
a set of covariates, x. Obviously, we also need the "variable" time (t) on the right-hand 
side of the model equation. However, it must be stressed that a sensible causal 
relation can only be assumed for the dependency of the transition rate on the 
covariates. The causal reasoning underlying the modeling approach (1.4) is 
As a causal effect, the changes in some covariates in the past may lead to changes 
in the transition rate in the future, which in turn describe the propensity that the units 
under study will change in some presupposed state space. As discussed above, this 
causal interpretation requires that we take the temporal order in which the process 
evolves very seriously. At any given point in time, t, the transition rate r(t) can be 
made dependent on conditions that happened to occur in the past, i.e. before t, but 
not on what is the case at t or in the future after t. With respect to these individuals, 
and while the process is evolving, there is always a distinction in past, present, and 
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future. This is particularly important for a causal view of the process. The past 
conditions the present, and what happens in the present shapes the future. There are 
many possibilities to specify the functional relationship g(.) in (1.4) (see Blossfeld and 
Rohwer 1995). 
It is sometimes argued that sociologists should give up the causal analytical point of 
view in favor of a systems view because the operation of causal forces is mutually 
interdependent and variables change each other more or less simultaneously in many 
systems (Marini and Singer 1988). However, even in systems of interdependent 
processes time does not run backwards, and change in one of the interdependent 
variables will take (at least a small amount of) time to produce a change in another 
one. Thus, in systems of variables there cannot be any simultaneity of causes and 
their effects. This allows to demonstrate that a causal approach to interdependent 
systems is possible with the help of the transition rate concept (see Blossfeld and 
Rohwer 1995). In other words, the systems view is not a substitute for a proper causal 
approach in our field (Kelly and McGrath 1988). 
Since the transition rate is indeed an abstraction, it is necessary to relate it back to 
quantities that are directly observable, that is to frequencies of state occupancies at 
particular points in time. To support such inferences, some additional statistical 
concepts are useful which are extensively described by Blossfeld and Rohwer (1995). 
3. Causal Modeling and Observation Plans 
Over the last 20 years, social scientists have been collecting event history data with 
increasing frequency. This is not an accidental trend, nor does it reflect a prevailing 
type of fashion in survey research. Instead, as discussed in the previous section, it 
indicates a growing recognition among social scientists that event history data is often 
the most appropriate empirical information one can get for a causal analysis. 
To colleet data generated by a continuous-time, discrete-state substantive process, 
different observation plans have been used (Coleman 1981; Tuma and Hannan 1984). 
With regard to the extent of detail about the process of change, one can distinguish 
between cross-sectional data, panel data, event count data, event sequence data, and 
event history data. 
In this paper, we will not discuss event count data (see Barron 1993), which simply 
record the number of different types of events for each unit (e.g. the number of 
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upward, downward, or lateral moves in the employment career in aperiod of 10 
years), and event sequence data, which document the sequence of states occupied 
by each unit, as they are rarely used in the social sciences. On the other hand, 
cross-sectional data and panel data are standard sociological data types (Tuma and 
Hannan 1984). It is, therefore, particularly intriguing to compare event history data with 
cross-sectional and panel data. We will use the example shown in Figure 3. In this 
figure, an individual's family career is observed in a cross-sectional survey, a panel 
survey and an event-oriented survey. 
Cross-Sectional Data 
Let us first discuss the cross-sectional observation. In the social sciences, this is the 
most common form of data for assessing the determinants of behavior. The family 
history of the individual in Figure 3 is represented by one single point in time: his or 
her marital state at the time of interview. Thus, a cross-sectional sam pie is only a 
"snapshot" of the substantive process being studied. The point in time when research-
ers take that II picture" is normally not determined by hypotheses about the dynamics 
of the substantive process itself, but by external considerations like getting research 
funds, finding an appropriate institute to conduct the survey etc. 
State space 
married 
consensual union 
single 
State space 
married 
consensual union 
single 
State space 
married 
consensual union 
single 
a) Cross-sectional sampie 
Timet 
b) Panel with 4 waves 
I 
t2 Timet 
c) Event oriented design 
t4 Time t 
Figure 3 Observation of an individual's family career on the basis of a cross-
sectional survey, a panel study md an event history oriented design. 
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Co/eman (1981) has demonstrated that one must be cautious in drawing inferences 
about exp/anatory variables on the basis of such data because, imp/icit/y or explicitly, 
socia/ researchers m ust assume that the substantive process under study is in some 
kind of statistica/ equilibrium. Statistica/ equilibrium or stability of the process means 
that whi/st individuals (or any other unit of analysis) may change their states over time, 
the state probabilities are fairly trendless or stable. Therefore, an equilibrium of the 
process requires that the inflows to and the outflows from each of the discrete states 
be equal over time to a large extent. It is only in such cases that one can reasonably 
assess the estimates of JQQl! and 109-1 inear analyses, as shown by Coleman (1981). 
However, these estimates are ambiguous because they on/y represent the net 
differences in the effects of independent variables (Coleman 1981; Blossfeld and 
Rohwer 1995). If there is no equilibrium in the process, cross-sectional coefficients 
may not only be ambiguous, but even present a completely misleadin9 picture. In a 
recent study on unemployment incidence, Rosenthai (1991), for example, demon-
strates how confusing cross-sectional estimates can be if the unemployment rate 
increases or decreases in a specific region and if the process of change is, therefore, 
not in equilibrium. 
In the social sciences one can expect that stability is very rare. For example, life 
history studies (Mayer 1990; Blossfeld 1989, 1995a, 1995b) show that change across 
age, cohort and historical period is an enduring and important feature in all domains 
of modern individuals' lives (Mayer and Tuma 1990); organizational studies demon-
strate that most social organizations seem to follow a program of growth and not of 
stability; and most modern societies reveal an accelerating rate of change in almost 
all of their subsystems (cf. the rapid changes in family systems, job structures, 
educational systems etc., see Heinz 1991 a, 1991 b, 1992; Mayer 1990; Blossfeld 1989, 
1995a, 1995b). But even in areas considered to be fairly stab/e, one must ask the 
crucial methodological question: to what extent is the process under study close to an 
equilibrium (Tuma and Hannan 1984)? This question can only be answered if 
longitudinal data are applied, as longitudinal data are the only type of data which 
indicate whether a steady state actually exists, or how long it will take until a system 
returns to a new equilibrium after some external upheaval. 
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Beyond the crucial assumption of process stability, cross-sectional data have many 
inferential limitations with regard to causal modeling. We want to address at least 
some of the more important problems here.13 
Direction of causality. There are only a few situations in which the direction of 
causality can be established based on cross-sectional data (Davies 1987). For 
example, consider the strong positive association between parental socioeconomic 
characteristics and educational attainment of sons and daughters, controlling for other 
important influences (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993). A convincing interpretation of this 
effect might be that being born into amiddie class family increases the likelihood of 
attaining a university degree because one is unable to think of any other plausible 
explanation for the statistical association. However, such recursive relationships, in 
which all the causal linkages run 1I0ne way" and have no "feedback" effects, are rare 
in social science research. For example, there is very often an association between 
the age of the youngest child and female labor force participation in modern 
industrialized societies (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). The common interpretation is 
that there is a one-way causality with young children tending to keep mothers at home. 
However, it is quite possible that the lack of jobs encourages women to enter into 
marriage and motherhood, suggesting a reversed relationship (Davies 1987). 
The ambiguity of causation seems to be particularly important for the modeling of the 
relationship between attitudes and behavior. There are two interesting aspects of this 
relationship: there is a direct effect in which behavior affects attitudes, and there is a 
"feedback" process where attitudes change behavior (Davies 1987). Footnote: The 
relationship between attitudes and behavior suggests that there is some kind of inertia 
(or positive feedback) which means that the probability of a specific behavior increases 
as a monotonic function of attitudes and attitudes depend on previous behavior 
(Davies and Crouchley 1985). The well-known disputes among sociologists, as to 
whether value change engenders change in social structure, or whether structural 
change leads to changing values of i individuals, often originates from the fact that 
cross-sectional surveys can only assess the net association of these two processes. 
Various strengths of reciprocal effects. Connected with the inability of establishing the 
direction of causality in cross-sectional surveys is the drawback that these data cannot 
be used to discover the different strengths of reciprocal effects. For example, many 
demographic studies have shown that first marriage and first motherhood are closely 
interrelated (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991). To understand what has been happening 
13 These problems are however not mutually exclusive. 
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with regard to family formation in modern societies, it might be of interest not only to 
know the effect of marriage on birth rates, but also the effect of pregnancy or first birth 
on getting married (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Blossfeld 1995a); and perhaps, how 
these effects have changed over historical time (Manting 1994). 
Observational data. Most sociological research is based on nonexperimental 
observations of social processes and these processes are highly selective. For 
example, Lieberson (1985) in a study examining the influence of type of school 
(private vs. public) on test performance among students distinguished at least three 
types of non-random processes: (1) there is self-selectivity, in which the units of 
analysis sort themselves out by choice (e.g. specific students choose specific types 
of schools); (2) there is selective assignment by the independent variable itself, which 
determines, say, what members of a population are exposed to specific levels of the 
independent variable (e.g. schools select their students based on their past 
achievement); and (3) there is also selectivity due to forces exogenous to variables 
under consideration at the time (socioeconomic background, ethnicity, gender, 
previous school career, changes of intelligence over age etc.); and many of these 
sources are not only not observed, but effectively unmeasurable. Although no 
longitudinal study will be able to overcome all the problems of identification of causal 
effects, cross-sectional data offer the worst of all opportunities to disentangle the 
effects of the causal factors of interest on the outcome from other forces operating at 
the same time because these data are least informative about the process of change. 
Cross-sectional analysis therefore requires a particularly careful justification, and the 
results must always be appropriately qualified (Davies 1987; Pickies and Davies 1989). 
Previous history. There is one aspect of observational data that deserves special 
attention in the social sciences. Life courses of individuals (and other units of analysis 
like organizations etc.) involve complex and cumulative time-related layers of 
selectivity (Mayer 1991). Therefore, there is a strong likelihood that specific individuals 
have been entering a specific origin state. In particular, life course research has shown 
that the past is an indispensible factor in understanding the present (Heinz 1991 a, 
1991 b, 1992; Mayer 1990). Cross-sectional analysis may be performed with some 
proxy-variables as weil as with assumptions of the causal order and interdependencies 
between the various explanatory variables. However, it is often not possible to 
appropriately trace back the time-related selective processes operating in the previous 
history, as these data are simply not available. Thus, the normal control approaches 
in cross-sectional statistical techniques will rarely be successful in isolating the 
influence of some specific causal force (Lieberson 1985). 
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Age and cohort effects. Cross-sectional data cannot be used to distinguish age and 
cohort effects (Tuma and Hannan 1984; Davies 1987). However, in many social 
science applications it is of substantive importance to know whether the behavior of 
people (e.g. their tendency to vote for a specific party) is different because they belong 
to different age groups or whether they are members of different birth cohorts 
(Blossfeld 1986, 1989). 
Historical settings. Cross-sectional data are not able to take into account the fact that 
processes emerge in particular historical settings. For example, in addition to individual 
resources (age, education, labor force experience etc.), there are at least two ways 
in which achanging labor market structure affects career opportunities. The first is that 
people start their careers in different structural contexts. It has often been assumed 
that these specific historie conditions at the point of entry into the labor market have 
a substantial impact upon people's subsequent careers. This kind of influence is 
generally called a cohort effect (Glenn 1977). The second way that changing labor 
market structure influences career opportunities is that it improves or worsens the 
career prospects of all people within the labor market at a given time. For example, 
in a favorable economic situation with low unemployment, there will be a relatively 
wide range of opportunities. This kind of influence is generally called aperiod effect 
(Mason and Fienberg 1985). With longitudinal data, Blossfeld (1986) has shown that 
lifecourse, cohort, and period effects can be identified based on substantively 
developed measures of these concepts (Rodgers 1982), and that these effects 
represent central mechanisms of career mobility that must be distinguished. 
Multiple clocks, historical eras and point-in-time events. From a theoretical or 
conceptual point of view, multiple clocks, historical eras and point-in-time events very 
often influence the substantive process being studied (Mayer and Tuma 1990). For 
example, in demographie studies of divorce, types of clocks, such as age of 
respondent, time of cohabitation, duration of marriage, ages of children, as weil as 
different phases in the state of the business cycle, or changes in national (divorce) 
laws are of importance (Blossfeld, Oe Rose, Hoem, and Rohwer 1993). With respect 
to cross-sectional data, such relationships can hardly be studied without making strong 
untestable assumptions. 
Contextual processes at different levels. Social scientists are very often interested in 
the influences of contextual processes at different aggregation levels (Huinink 1989). 
Contextual process effects refer to situations where changes in the group contexts 
themselves influence the dependent variable. For example, career mObility of an 
individual may be conceptualized as being dependent on changes in resources at the 
individual level (e.g. social background, educational attainment, experience etc.), the 
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success of the firm in which he/she is employed (e.g. expansion or contraction of the 
organization) at the intermediate level, and changes in the business cycle at the macro 
level (Blossfeld 1986; DiPrete 1993). Cross-sectional data do not provide an adequate 
opportunity for the study of such influences at different levels (Mayer and Turna 1990). 
Duration dependence. Another problem of cross-sectional data is that they are 
inherently ambiguous with respect to their interpretation at the level of the unit of 
observation. Suppose we know that in the Federal Republic of Germany, 30.6 per cent 
of employed women were working part-time in 1970 (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). At 
the one extreme, this might be interpreted to imply that each employed woman had 
a 30.6 per cent chance of being employed part-time in this year, but on the other, one 
could infer that 30.6 per cent of the employed women always worked part-time and 
69.4 per cent were full-timers only. In other words, cross-sectional data do not convey 
information about the time women spent in these different employment forms. They 
are therefore open to quite different substantive interpretations (Heckman and Willis 
1977; Flinn and Heckman 1982). In the first case, each woman would be expected to 
move back and forth between part-time and full-time employment. In the second, there 
is no mobility between part-time and full-time work, and the estimated percentages 
describe the proportions of two completely different groups of employed women. From 
an analytical point of view, it is therefore important to have data about durations in a 
state. Also, repeated cross-sectional analysis using comparable sampies of the same 
population (e.g. aseries of microcensuses or cross-sectional surveys), can only show 
net change, not the flow of individuals. 
Variability in state dependencies. In many situations cross-sectional data are 
problematic because the rate of change is strongly state dependent and entries into 
and exits from these states are highly variable over time (e.g. over the life course and 
historical period or ac ross cohorts). For example, it is well-known that the roles of 
wives and mothers (the latter in particular) have been central in women's lives. 
Therefore, the fam ily cycle concept has frequently been used in sociology to describe 
significant changes in the circumstances which affect the availability of women for paid 
work outside the home. The basic idea is that there is a set of ordered stages primarily 
defined by variations in family composition and size that could be described with 
cross-sectional data. However, this view often leads to the tendency to assume that 
what happens to different women in various phases in the family cycle at one point in 
time is sim ilar to the pattern that women experience when they make these transitions 
in different historical times (which has been called the "life course fallacy"). Moreover, 
there is the well-known problem that individuals and families often fail to conform to 
the assumption of a single progression through a given number of stages in a 
predetermined order. At least three reasons for this may exist (Murphy 1991): (1) the 
25 
chronology of timing of events may not conform to the ideal model, for example 
childbearing may start before marriage; (2) many stages are not reached, for example, 
by never-married persons; and (3) the full set of stages may be truncated by events 
such as death or marital breakdown. Such complex constellations between the family 
cycle and women's labor force participation could hardly be meaningfully described or 
studied on the basis of cross-sectional data (see also Blossfeld 1995b). 
Changes in outcomes. Cross-sectional models very often have a tendency to 
over-predict change and consistently over-estimate the importance of explanatory 
variables (Davies 1987). The reason for this phenomenon is that these analyses 
cannot be based on how changes in explanatory variables engender changes in 
outcomes. They are only concerned with how levels of explanatory variables "explain" 
an outcome at a specific point in time. However, if an outcome at time t (e.g. ehoice 
of mode of travel to work in June) is dependent on a previous outcome (e.g. 
established choice of mode of travel to work), and if both outeomes are positively 
influeneed in the same way by an explanatory variable (e.g. merits of public transport), 
then the effeet of the explanatory variable will reflect both the true positive influence 
of the explanatory variable on the outcome at time t and a positive spurious element . 
due to that variable acting as a proxy for the omitted earlier outeome (established 
mode of travel to work). Thus, a cross-sectional analysis of the travel to work choice 
(e.g. public vs. private transport) would have a tendency to overprediet the effect of 
policy changes (e.g. fare increases or faster buses) beeause there is a strong 
behavioral inertia (Davies 1987). 
These examples show that cross-sectional data have many severe inferential 
limitations for social scientists. Therefore, it is not surprising that causal eonclusions 
based on cross-sectional data have often been radically alte red after the processes 
were studied with longitudinal data (Lieberson 1985). 
Longitudinal studies also have a m uch greater power than cross-seetional ones, both 
in the estimation of bias from missing data, and in the means for correeting it. This is 
because in longitudinal studies one often has data from previous points in time, thus 
enabling the characteristics of non-responders or lost units to be assessed with some 
precision. It is noteworthy that almost all the substantive knowledge concerning the 
biases associated with missing data, whieh all studies must seek to minimize, is 
derived from longitudinal studies (Medical Research Council 1992). 
Although longitudinal data are no panacea, they are obviously more effective in causal 
analysis and have less inferential limitations (Magnusson, Bergmann and Torestad 
1991; Arminger, Clogg and Sobel 1995; Clogg and Arminger 1993; Blossfeld 1995a, 
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1995b; Mayer 1990; Mayer and Tuma 1990). They are indispensable for the study of 
processes over the life course (of all types of units) and their relation to historical 
change. Therefore, research designs aimed at a causal understanding of social 
processes should be based on longitudinal data at the level of the units of analysis. 
Panel Data 
The temporal data most often available to sociologists are panel data, for which the 
same persons or units are re-interviewed or observed at aseries of discrete points in 
time (Chamberlain 1984; Hsiao 1986; Arminger and Muller 1990; Engel and Reinecke 
1994). Figure 3 shows four-wave panel in which the family career of the respondent 
was observed at four different points in time. This means that there is only information 
on states of the units at pre-determined survey points, but the course of the events 
between the survey points remains unknown. 
Panel data normally contain more information than cross-sectional data, but involve 
well-known distortions created by the method itself (see, e.g., Magnusson and 
Bergmann 1990; Hunt 1985): 
Panel bias. Respondents often answer many questions differently in the second and 
later waves than they did the first time; perhaps this is because they are less inhibited, 
or they mulled over or discussed the issues between questioning dates. 
Modification of processes. Panels tend to influence the very phenomena they seek to 
observe - this changes the natural history of the processes being observed. 
Regression to the mean. During the first panel wave, some panel members answer 
specific questions a bit differently than they normally would, due to chance circum-
stances at the time of measurement. For example, when a respondent has some 
problems during the first observation, he/she may perform poorly on some topics, but 
will report more accurately at the next panel wave. This phenomenon, known as 
"regression to the mean," can easily be mistaken by researchers for specific trends. 
Attrition of the sam pie. In panel studies the composition of the sampie normaliy 
diminishes selectively as time goes by. Therefore, what researchers observe in the 
panel may not give a true view of what has happened to their original sam pie. 
Non-responses and missing data. In a cross-sectional analysis, one can afford to 
throw out a small number of cases with linon-responses" and "missing data," but in a 
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long-term longitudinal study, throwing out incomplete cases at each round of 
observations can eventually leave a severely pruned sam pie having very different 
characteristics from the original one. 
Fallacy of cohort centrism. Very often panel studies are focused on members of a 
specific cohort (cf., for example, the British National Child Study). In other words, 
these panels study respondents that were born in, grew up in, and have lived in a 
particular segment of history. There is therefore a danger that researchers might 
assume that what happens to a particular group of people over time reveals general 
principles of the life course (fallacy of cohort centrism). Many events may simply be 
specific for that generation. 
Fallacy of period centrism. Many panel studies include just a few waves and, 
therefore, cover only a short period of historical time (cf. the German Socio-Economic 
Panel which now covers 10 years). At the time of a particular observation, special 
conditions may ex ist and this can result in an individual responding differently than 
he/she normally would (fallacy of historical period). 
Confounded age, period and cohort effects. In any long-term panel study in sociology, 
three causal factors - individual's age, cohort, and period effect - are confounded (cf. 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics). Analytical techniques are necessary to 
unconfound these three factors and reveal the role of each. As discussed in more 
detail below, panel data do have some specific problems unconfounding the three 
major factors. However, for gaining scientific insights into the interplay of processes 
governing life courses from birth to death, they appear to be a better approach than 
applying cross-sections. But a mechanical and atheoretical cohort analysis is a useless 
exercise and statistical innovations alone will not solve the age-period-cohort problem 
(Blossfeld 1986; Mayer and Huinink 1990). 
Most of the above-mentioned difficulties concerning panel studies can be dealt with 
by sophisticated statistical procedures or more panel waves. However, panel data also 
lead to aseries of deficiencies with respect to the estimation of transition rates (Tuma 
and Hannan 1984): first, there is the problem of "embeddability," which means that 
there may be difficulties in embedding a matrix of observed transition probabilities 
within a continuous-time Markov process (Singer and Spilerman 1976a); second, there 
is the problem that there may be no unique matrix of transition rates describing the 
data (Singer and Spilerman 1976b); and third, there is the drawback that the observed 
matrix of transition probabilities may be very sensitive to sampling and measurement 
error (Tuma and Hannan 1984). Multiple waves with irregular spacing or shorter 
intervals between waves can reduce these problems. However, as Hannan and Tuma 
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(1979) have noted, the more panel and event history data resemble each other, the 
less problematic modeling becomes. 
Lazarsfeld (1948, 1972) was among the first sociologists to propose panel analysis of 
discrete variables. In particular, he wanted to find a solution to the problem of 
ambiguity in causation. He suggested that if one wants to know whether a variable X 
induces change in another variable Y, or whether Y induces change in X, observations 
of X and Y at two points in time would be necessary. Lazarsfeld applied this method 
to dichotomous variables whose time-related structure he analyzed in a resulting 
sixteenfold table. Later on, Goodman (1973) applied log-linear analysis to such tables. 
For many years, such a cross-Iagged panel analysis for qualitative and quantitative 
variables (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Shingles 1976) was considered to be a 
powerful quasi-experimental method of making causal inferences. It was also extended 
to multiwave-multivariable panels to study more complex path models with structural-
equation models (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993). However, it appears that the strength 
of the panel design for causal inference was hugely exaggerated (Davis 1978). Causal 
inferences in panel approaches are m uch more complicated than has been generally 
realized. Several reasons are responsible for this: 
Time until the effect starts to occur. As discussed above, it is important to realize that 
the role of time in causal explanations does not only lie in specifying a temporal order 
in which the effect follows the cause in time. It additionally means that a temporal 
interval is necessary for the cause to have an impact (Kelly and McGrath 1988). The 
time interval may be short or long, but can never be zero or infinity (Kelly and McGrath 
1988). In most of the current sociological theories and interpretations of research 
findings this interval is left unspecified. In most cases, at least implicitly, researchers 
assume that the effect takes place almost immediately. Of course, if this is the case, 
then there seems to be no need for theoretical statements about the time course of 
causal effects. A single measurement of the effect at some point in time after a cause 
has been imposed might be sufficient for catching it (see Figure 1 a). However, if there 
is a reason to assume that there is a .@g between cause and effect, then a single 
measurement of the outcome is inadequate for describing the process (see Figure 1 b); 
and the interpretation arrived at on the basis of that single measurement will be a 
function of the point in time chosen to measure the effect. Thus, a restrictive (implicit) 
assumption of panel designs is that either cause and effect occur almost simulta-
neously, or the interval between observations is of approximately the same length as 
the true causal lag. The greater the discrepancy, the greater the likelihood that the 
panel analysis will fail to discover the true causal process. Thus, as expressed by 
Davis (1978), if one does not know the causal lag exactly, panel analysis is not of 
much utility to establish causal direction or time sequencing of causal effects. 
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Unfortunately, we rarely, if ever, have enough information about the detailed structure 
of a social process to specify the true lag precisely. 
Temporal shapes of the unfolding effect. While the problem of time-Iags is widely 
recognized in sociology, there is almost no discussion with respect to the temporal 
shapes of effects (Kelly and McGrath 1988) (see Figure 1). If the effect increases or 
decreases monotonically (Figure 1 c) or linearly, oscillates in cycles (Figure 1.e), or 
shows any other complicated time-related pattern, then the strength of the observed 
effect is dependent on the timing of the J2anel waves. A panel design might be 
particularly problematic if there are non-monotonic cycles of the effect, because totally 
opposite conclusions about the effects of the explanatory variable can be arrived at, 
depending on whether the panel places measurement points at a peak or at an ebb 
in the curve (see Figures 1 d and 1 e). 
Reciprocal effects with different time-paths. In cases of reciprocal causality, additional 
problems will arise if the time structure of the effects of X1 on X2 and of X2 on X1 are 
different with respect to lags and shapes. In these situations, a panel design might turn 
out to be completely useless for those wishing to detect such time-related recursive 
relationships. 
Observational data and timing of measurement of explanatory variables. Most 
sociological research is based on observational data, meaning that manipulation of the 
timing of the independent variables is generally not possible. For example, if the 
researcher is going to study the effects of job mobility on marriage behavior, it is 
impossible to force respondents to change their jobs, say, at the time of the first panel 
wave. Thus, the longer the interval between panel waves, the more uncerta.inty there 
will be regarding the exact point in time when an individual moved to another job and 
therefore about the point we evaluate in the time-path of the effect (Coleman 1981). 
The situation may be even more problematic if changes in independent variables are 
repeatable and several changes are possible between two successive panel waves, 
as might be the case with job shifts observed in yearly intervals (cf. Sandefur and 
Tuma 1987). In such panel studies, even the causal order of explanatory and 
dependent events may become ambiguous. 
Observational data and the timing of control variables. Observational studies take 
place in natural settings and, therefore, offer little control over changes in other 
important variables and their timing. If these influences change arbitrarily and have 
time-related effect patterns, then panel studies are useless in disentangling the effect 
of interest from time-dependent effects of other parallel exogenous processes. 
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Continuous changes of explanatory and control variables. In observational studies, 
explanatory and control variables may not only change stepwise from one state to 
another, but can often change continuously over time. For example, individuals 
continuously change age, constantly acquire general labor force experience or 
job-specific human capital if they are employed (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991), are 
exposed to continuously changing historical conditions (Blossfeld 1986), are steadily 
changing their social relationships in marital or consensual unions (Blossfeld, Oe Rose, 
Hoem, and Rohwer 1993), etc. Even in cases where these continuous changes are 
not connected with lags or time-related effect patterns, there are deficiencies of panel 
data concerning their capabilities of detecting time dependence in substantive 
processes. This is why panel analysis can often not appropriately identify age, period, 
and cohort effects (Blossfeld 1986). 
Therefore, the use of panel data causes an identification problem due to omitted 
factors whose effects are summarized in a disturbance term. These factors are not 
stable over time, which means that the disturbance term cannot be uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables. Panel analysis therefore critically depends on solutions to 
the problem of autocorrelation. This problem can be reasonably weil tackled by 
increasing the number of panel waves and modifying their spacing. Panel analysis is 
particularly sensitive to the length of the time intervals between waves relative to the 
speed of the process (Coleman 1981). They can be too short, so that too few events 
will be observed, or too long, so that it is difficult to establish a time-order between 
events (Sandefur and Tuma 1987). A major advantage of the continuous-time 
observation design in event history analysis is therefore that it makes the timing 
between waves irrelevant (Coleman 1968). 
Event History Oata 
For many processes in the social sciences, a continuous measurement of qualitative 
variables seems to be the only adequate method of assessing empirical change. This 
is achieved by utilizing an event oriented observation design which records all the 
changes in qualitative variables and their tim ing. As shown in Figure 3, the major 
advantage of event history data is that they provide the most complete data possible 
on changes in qualitative variabies which may occur at any point in time. The 
observation of events therefore provides an attractive alternative to the observation of 
states for social scientists. 
Event history data, mostly collected retrospectively via life history studies, covers the 
whole life course of individuals. An example for such a study is the German Life 
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History Study (GLHS, Mayer and Brückner 1989). Retrospective studies have the 
advantage of normally being cheaper to collect than panel data. They are also 
systematically coded to one framework of codes and meanings (Dex 1991). But 
retrospective (in contrast to prospective) studies suffer from several limitations that 
have been increasingly acknowledged (Medical Research Council 1992): 
Non-factual data. It is well-known that retrospective questions concerning motivational, 
attitudinal, cognitive, or affective states are particularly problematic because the 
respondents can hardly recall the timing of changes in these states accurately 
(Hannan and Tuma 1979). This type of data is not verifiable even in principle, as these 
states exist only in the minds of the respondents and are only directly accessible, if 
at al/, to the respondent concerned (Sudman and Bradburn 1986). For these 
non-factual data, panel studies have the advantage of being able to repeatedly record 
current states of the same individual over time. Thus, for studies aiming to model the 
relationship between attitudes and behavior over time, panel observations of attitudinal 
states, combined with retrospective information on behavioral events since the last 
sweep, appear to be an appropriate design. 
Recall problems with regard to behavior or facts. Behavioral or factual questions ask 
the respondents about characteristics, things they have done, or things that have 
happened to them which in principle are verifiable by an external observer. Most 
surveys (cross-sectional, panel or event oriented) elicit retrospective information on 
behavior or facts (e.g. by asking people about their education, social origin etc.), so 
that the disadvantages of retrospection are only a matter of degree. However, event 
history studies are particularly ambitious (see Mayer and Brückner 1989). They try to 
collect continuous records of qualitative variables that have a high potential for bias 
because of their strong reliance on memory. However, research on the accuracy of 
retrospective data shows that individuals' marital and fertility histories, family 
characteristics and education, health service usage, and employment history can be 
collected to a reasonable degree of accuracy. A very good overview concerning the 
kinds of data which can be retrospectively col/ected, the factors affecting recall 
accuracy, and the methods improving recall has been presented by Shirley Dex 
(1991 ). 
Unknown factors. Retrospective designs cannot be used to study factors involving 
variables that are not known to the respondent (e.g. emotional and behavioral 
problems when the respondent was a child). In such cases, panel studies are 
indispensable (Medical Research Council 1992). 
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Limited capacity. There is a limit to respondents' tolerance for the amount of data 
which can be collected on one occasion (Medical Research Council 1992). A carefully 
corsetted panel design can therefore provide a broader coverage of variables (if these 
are not unduly influenced by variations at the time of assessment). 
Only survivors. Due to their nature, retrospective studies must be based on survivors. 
Thus, those subjects who have died or migrated from the geographical area under 
study will necessarily be omitted. If either is related to the process (as often may be 
the case), biases will arise. This problem is particularly important for retrospective 
studies involving a broad range of birth cohorts, like the GLHS or international 
migration studies (Btossfeld 1987). 
Misrepresentation of specific populations. Retrospective studies also systematically 
misrepresent specific populations. For example, Duncan (1966) has shown that if men 
are asked about their fathers, men from earlier generations who had no sons, or 
whose sons died or emigrated are not represented in a retrospective father-son 
mobility table. 
4. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to show that - compared to alternative observation 
plans - the collection of event history data is an extremely useful approach for 
uncovering causal relationships or mapping out systems of causal relations. Event 
history models provide a natural basis for a causal understanding of social processes 
because they relate the change in future outcomes to conditions in the past at each 
point in time and enable the researcher to predict future changes on the basis of past 
observations at each moment of the process (Aalen 1987). 
In the past, event history data normally have been collected retrospectively leading to 
specific problems described above. To avoid these problems (or to diminsh their 
relevance), a mixed design employing a follow-up (or "catch-up") and a follow-back 
strategy appears to combine the strengths of panel designs with the virtues of 
retrospective studies. Therefore, in modern panel studies event histories are collected 
retrospectively for the period before the panei started and between the successive 
panel waves. Sometimes, complete administrative records also contain time-related 
information about events in the past. In any case, with regard to cross-sectional and 
tranditional panel data, all of these procedures (retrospective, combined follow-up and 
back-up, or available registers) ofter a comparatively superior opportunity for modeling 
social processes, regardless of which method is selected. 
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